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The Internet as we know it today, despite being “the result of a series of accidents
of choices” in Prof. Jon Crowcroft’s words, has undoubtedly been an amazing success
story. However, it has been constantly challenged by the demands of the overwhelming
evolution of data traffic types, non-functional needs of applications and users, and device
diversity. The phrase “future internet architecture” can be interpreted as referring to
a revised set of design principles [43]. As Dr David Clark rightfully suggested, we need
to “allow for the future in the face of the present”. Content Centric Networking (CCN)
is one of the candidates for a future internet architecture. Security is one of the most
significant considerations while designing a future internet architecture. Availability,
Integrity, and Confidentiality (AIC) are considered the three most crucial components of
security: 1) availability is the assurance of continuous, reliable, and uninterrupted access
to the information by authorized people, 2) integrity is the preservation of information and
prevention of any change in it caused via accident or malicious intent, and 3) confidentiality
is the ability to keep the information secret from unintended audience, intruders, and
adversaries. This thesis discusses AIC related security threats and corresponding remedies
for Named Data Networking (NDN) which is a promising example of CCN. It also presents
a system dynamics modelling approach to bridge the gap between the technical solutions
and business strategy by quantifying some of the qualitative variables salient to technology
architects, policymakers, lawmakers, regulators, and internet service providers for the
design of a future-proof internet architecture.
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The work focusing on the three case studies presented in Chapter 5 builds on and extends
the work submitted for my M.Sc. dissertation [78]. However, it is imperative to clarify the
substantial differences. Although the case studies are the same as in the M.Sc thesis, and
some of the data (from 50 interviews) was re-used, additional data (from 200 interviews)
was further collected and re-analysed. Moreover, although the same modelling method
(i.e., System Dynamics) is applied, it is to a different problem and data, and therefore
produces different knowledge, specially in correlation to the technical work presented in





This chapter discusses the problem statement or the falsifiable hypothesis explored in
the rest of this thesis, the term “internet architecture” and the need for a new one,
enlists some of the prospective future internet architectures, introduces the reader to
Content Centric Networking (CCN)/ Named Data Networking (NDN) architectures and
the Availability, Integrity, and Confidentiality (AIC) triad, presents the thesis road-map,
list of contributions, and the research methodologies used for this thesis.
1.1 Thesis problem statement
“It is possible to address security requirements including Availability, Integrity, and Confi-
dentiality for Content Centric Networking (CCN). We can attempt to do so by evaluating
the threats to: 1) Availability of CCN via a DDoS attack, 2) Integrity of CCN through a
content poisoning attack and, 3) Confidentiality of CCN through content name privacy
threats, and their respective countermeasures. Additionally, we can demonstrate that the
trade-offs in doing so imply that these previously overlooked non-functional aspects of
CCN could now be quantitatively factored into the design and deployment plans for the
prospective future internet architecture”.
The current Internet has been constantly challenged by the demands of the overwhelm-
ing evolution of data traffic types, non-functional needs of applications and users, and
device diversity: presenting the need for a future internet architecture. There are various
prospective internet architectures including Named Data Networking (NDN) which is a
promising example of Content-Centric Networking (CCN). This thesis discusses Availability,
Integrity, and Confidentiality (AIC) related security threats in NDN, namely Distributed
Denial of Service attacks, content poisoning, and NDN name privacy respectively, and the
corresponding technical remedies. It is noteworthy that to design an effective future-proof
internet architecture, the technical problems and their solutions must not be considered in
isolation. To address this concern, this thesis also presents a system dynamics modelling
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approach to bridge the gap between the technical solutions and the non-functional require-
ments by quantifying some of the qualitative variables salient to technology architects,
policymakers, lawmakers, regulators, and internet service providers for the design of a
future-proof internet architecture.
1.2 Future internet architectures
What is an internet architecture and why we need a new one?
According to the Cambridge English dictionary, the word “architecture” means the art and
practice of designing and making buildings. The same dictionary defines the word “internet”
as “the large system of connected computers around the world that allows people to share
information and communicate with each other”. The word internet was coined in the
1970s denoting a computer network connecting two or more smaller networks, derived from
inter meaning ‘reciprocal and/or mutual’ and network. Based on the literal meanings of
the words, an internet architecture can be safely described as a set of principles governing
the art and practice of designing and developing a system that is capable of connecting
computers (and various other connectable devices in the modern world).
As Dr David Clark has fittingly described in his book titled “Designing an internet” [43],
the computer scientists tend to design an internet architecture based on what worked
in the past for a specific use case, such as the current public global network known as
“the Internet”, private networks such as those used by defence departments of a country,
and special purpose-built networks such as financial networks (e.g., Blockchain), thus
misrepresenting the word “architecture” as the real design process remains missing from
the foundation and is later carried out by other stakeholders.
The Internet is an amazing success story, connecting billions of users, facilitating
scientific research, social, industrial, and economic development. However, the ever-
changing dynamics of data, devices, and communication media require much more from
an internet architecture. In Prof. Jon Crowcroft’s words, “the Internet that we use today,
is the result of a series of accidents of choices” since the 1970s. It was originally designed
to connect computers; primary applications were remote terminal access, file transfer,
and e-mail. With the need to connect clients and servers for web browsing content and
subsequently video/audio streaming, the Internet had to evolve from computer-to-computer
communication, to content-to-user communication.
The constantly evolving diversity of modern-day content and of the devices accessing it
and the dynamically evolving needs of scalability, accessibility, affordability, security, and
privacy etc.1, have been indicating the need for a future internet architecture for quite
1Some more seemingly non-functional requirements of a future internet architecture are enlisted in
Chapter 5.
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some time. It is also worthwhile to mention here that whether a requirement is functional
or non-functional is a contextual fact. What may be a functional requirement for one
technical concept or product, might be non-functional for another, e.g., privacy, delay, and
availability, etc.
Prospective candidates for a future internet architecture
The US National Science Foundation (NSF) sponsored the following four internet architec-
tures under the Future Internet Architectures (FIA) program:
1. XIA
2. MobilityFirst
3. Information Centric Networking (ICN)/ Content Centric Networking (CCN)/ Named
Data Networking (NDN)
4. Nebula





Moreover, there are some other prospective future internet architecture proposals
such as the Accountable Internet [28] and I3 [114], etc., which have recently been
gaining the attention of researchers globally.
1.3 Security by design in future internet architec-
tures
Driven by the challenges faced by the current IP Internet architecture, the increasing
significance of internet connectivity in financial transactions, and the growing threat
of new sophisticated attacks, “security by design” has rightfully been among the
main goals of most future internet architecture projects. Based on the learning
experiences from the current Internet architecture, it seems imperative that we
amalgamate necessary security provisions in the nascent stages of a future internet
architecture design.
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There is an old saying among security experts [43]: “A system without a specification
cannot fail; it can only present surprises”. Just like the architectural design of the
current Internet came into being without defining its exact requirements or utility,
the security of a future internet architecture must be designed prior to knowing
about the security threats that the future internet utilization may present. In other
words, we do not only need a futuristic but a future-proof internet architecture.
In order to design a a future-proof and secure future internet architecture, infor-
mation security can no longer be considered in isolation. It overlaps with various
social, political, demographic, economic, and legal/regulatory aspects of internet
usage. Availability, integrity, and confidentiality of data require input not only from
technology, but more importantly from people and processes. Chapter 5 of this thesis
presents some of the non-functional requirements to be considered while designing a
future internet architecture. Security is a significant one among those. Ambrosin et
al. provide a detailed analysis and comparison of security and privacy features and
concerns in the aforementioned NSF-funded future internet architectures [26].
1.4 Content-Centric and Named Data Network-
ing overview
Information Centric Networking (ICN) emphasizes on efficient and scalable content
distribution. Named Data Networking (NDN) [2], a fork from PARC’s Content-
Centric Networking (CCNx) architecture [1], is one such research effort. Content-
Centric Networking (CCN) is a notable Information-Centric Networking (ICN)
architecture. Named Data Networking (NDN) exemplifies CCN and is one of the five
NSF-sponsored Future Internet Architectures (FIA) [3]. Most of the work done in this
thesis is based on NDN. However, it can be applied to any CCN internet architecture.
Hence, in this thesis the names NDN and CCN have been used interchangeably.
One of the main principles of NDN is named content. NDN also stipulates in-
network content caching, by routers. To secure each content, NDN requires it to
be cryptographically signed by its producer. This way, globally addressable and
routable content can be authenticated by anyone, which allows NDN to decouple
trust in content from trust in entities that store and disseminate it. NDN entities
that request content are called consumers.
Unlike the IP based Internet that relies upon the end-points of communication
and their names/addresses, NDN [80] [2] focuses on content which is named, ad-
dressable, and routable at the network layer. Each NDN content object is as-
signed a unique name. A content name is hierarchical and is composed of one
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or more variable-length components opaque to the network. Component bound-
aries are explicitly delimited by “/” in the usual path-like representation. For
example, the name of BBC News web page content for May 28, 2019 might be:
/ndn/BBC/news/28May2019/index.html. Large content can be split into seg-
ments with different names, e.g., segment number 9 of Bob’s YouTube video could
be named: /ndn/youtube/bob/video.avi/9.
By explicit naming of the data and binding of this name with a cryptographic
signature [21], NDN provides a number of benefits including data-centric security,
support for universal in-network caching, built-in multicast delivery, better alignment
between the desired application usages, and the underlying data delivery model in
general.
NDN communication uses the pull model and content is delivered to consumers only
following an explicit request. There are two types of packets in NDN namely interest
and content. A consumer requests content by issuing an interest packet for a given
name. This interest can be satisfied from a producer or router. If an entity (an edge
router or producer, whichever is nearer in the network) can “satisfy” a given interest,
it returns the corresponding content packet. Content delivery must be preceded
by an interest. If content C with name N is received by a router with no pending
interest for N, C is considered unsolicited and is discarded. Name matching in NDN is
prefix-based. For example, an interest for /ndn/youtube/george/video2.avi
can be satisfied by content named /ndn/youtube/george/video2.avi/19;
the reverse of this would not work.
NDN content includes several fields. A content message includes a name, a payload,
and a digital signature computed by the content producer. Unlike content, interests
are not signed. An interest message must include the name of the requested content.
In case of multiple pieces of content sharing a given name, additional control
information may be held within the interest to specify the desired content or to
restrict the undesired content. Content signatures provide data origin authentication.
Some of the important NDN content fields are described below:
• Signature - a public key signature, generated by the content producer,
covering the entire content, including all explicit components of the name and
a reference to the public key needed to verify it.
• Name - a sequence of explicit name components followed by an implicit digest
(cryptographic hash) component of the content that is recomputed at every hop.
This effectively provides each content with a unique name and guarantees a
match with a name provided in an interest. However, in most cases, the digest
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component is not present in interest packets since NDN does not provide any
secure mechanism for a consumer to learn a content hash prior to requesting it.
• PublisherPublicKeyDigest (PPKD) - SHA256 digest of the public key
needed to verify the content signature.
• Type - content type, e.g., data, encrypted content, key, etc.
• Freshness - recommended content lifetime (after being cached) set by the
producer.
• KeyLocator - reference to the public key required to verify the signature.
This field has three options: (1) verification key, (2) certificate containing the
verification key, or (3) NDN name referencing the content that contains the
verification key.
Each content producer must have at least one public key, represented as a bona fide
named content of Type = key, signed by its issuer, e.g., a certification authority (CA)2.
The naming convention for a public key content object is to contain “key” as its
last explicit component, e.g., /ndn/uk/london-airport/transit/lounge/key. An NDN
interest includes the following fields:
• Name - NDN name of the requested content.
• Exclude - contains information about name components that must not occur
in the name of returned content. This field can also be used to exclude certain
content by referring to its digest, which, as noted above, is included in the
content as an implicit last component of each content name, or in a separate
field.
• PublisherPublicKeyDigest (PPKD) - the SHA-256 digest of the pub-
lisher public key. If this field is present in the interest, a matching content
object must have the same digest in its PPKD.
There are three types of NDN node entities:
(a) consumer3 - an entity that issues an interest for content.
(b) producer - an entity that produces and publishes (as well as signs) content.
(c) router - an entity that routes interest packets and forwards corresponding
content packets.
Each node entity maintains the following three components:
2NDN is agnostic to trust management, aiming to accommodate peer-based, hierarchical, and hybrid
PKI approaches.
3A consumer can also be a producer of the content.
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(a) Content Store (CS) - cache used for content caching and retrieval. From here
on, we use the terms CS and cache interchangeably.
(b) Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) - routing table of name prefixes and corre-
sponding outgoing interfaces used to route interests. NDN does not specify or
mandate any routing protocol. Forwarding is done via longest-prefix match on
names.
(c) Pending Interest Table (PIT) - table of outstanding (pending) interests and a
set of corresponding incoming and outgoing interfaces.
When a router receives an interest for the content name which is not in its cache and
there are no pending interests for the same in its PIT, it forwards the interest to the
next hop(s) according to its FIB. For each forwarded interest, a router stores some
amount of state information, including the name in the interest and the interface
on which it arrived. However, if an interest for content Cn arrives while there is a
pending entry for the same content name in the PIT, the router collapses the present
interest (and any subsequent interests for Cn) storing only the interface upon which it
was received. If and when the required content is returned, the router forwards it out
on all incoming interest interfaces and flushes the corresponding PIT entry. Since no
additional information is needed to deliver the content, an interest does not carry any
source address. If a content fails to arrive before some router-determined expiration
time, the router can either flush the PIT entry or attempt interest re-transmission
over the same or different interfaces.
An NDN router’s cache size is determined by the local resource availability. Each
router unilaterally determines which content to cache and for how long, though
lifetime (as mentioned above) can be recommended by the producer. Upon receiving
an interest, a router first checks its cache to see if it already has the requested content
in its cache. Signed producer-originated content allows consumers and routers to
authenticate it upon reception regardless of the entity serving it.
1.5 Availability, Integrity, and Confidentiality in
CCN
Security issues are broadly concerned with availability, integrity, and/or confiden-
tiality of information or data involved. This thesis presents three different security
threats and their mitigation, each belonging to these three distinct areas of security
and their mitigation. It can safely be said that for any security risk, threat, and
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vulnerability, the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of information/data are
closely linked, impacting each other directly or indirectly.
The CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) triad is the most popular
reference model for information security and information assurance, sometimes
affectionately referred to as the Holy Trinity of Data Security [95]. The CIA Triad
is also called the AIC (Availability, Integrity, and Confidentiality) triad to avoid
confusion with a well-known three-letter American intelligence services’ agency.
In this AIC model [72], availability refers to a state where authorized people are
guaranteed to have reliable access to the information, integrity is the preservation
of trustworthiness and healthiness of data and prevention of its tampering by
unauthorized users, and confidentiality stands for a set of directives that prevent the
exposure of data to unauthorized parties by governing and limiting access to it.
In this section we provide a high-level overview of some well-known security issues
in CCN.
Consumer security
A consumer which does not produce any content, is not a traceable nor addressable
host as it has no assigned namespace and no corresponding public key that could be
used to verify its content. As a result, routers shall not be forwarding any interests
to that consumer. Also, the CCN design implies that routers only forward content
towards a consumer if the consumer has specifically requested it through an interest.
Hence a consumer will not receive unwanted traffic unless sent maliciously by a
router directly connected to it. This is a distinct security advantage of CCN over IP.
Router security
With the exception of FIB, which is influenced exclusively by control traffic, a regular
IP router is stateless with respect to data traffic [62]. The CCN router performs
more complex functions as it needs to maintain a Pending Interest Table (PIT) and
may or may not maintain a cache. PIT and cache depend on correspondence with
consumers and producers, requiring processing ability that is not needed in an IP
router. Also, additional functionality is required of a CCN router to be able to verify
content signature. These additional features make a CCN router more susceptible to
availability attacks such as Denial of Service through interest flooding as discussed
in Chapter 2.
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Cache and content security
Cache and/or content poisoning attacks target the availability of the network and
hence the availability of information. In a cache poisoning attack, an adversary
injects corrupted or fake content into router caches. A content can be termed as fake
if it has a valid signature, but is generated with a wrong private key for the name
under which it is published, i.e., by an incorrect producer [62] [63]. A corrupted
content is one carrying an invalid signature. A content poisoning attack involves
injecting fake or corrupted content into the network [66]. Content poisoning and a
proposed mechanism for its mitigation is discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
Since each NDN content is signed, a consumer can perform signature verification
on all received content and can request a different copy of the content using the
Exclude field in the interest. Moreover, any NDN router can perform signature
verification for any content to be forwarded or cached. Theoretically, content
signatures provide an effective defence against content poisoning attacks since the
fake or corrupted content can be easily detected and discarded before being forwarded
to the consumers. However, signature verification as a process faces two major
challenges. The first challenge is router overhead and hence efficiency problems.
The second challenge is trust management which includes obtaining the right key to
verify a content signature.
1.6 Thesis road map
This thesis is divided into six chapters.
(a) The first chapter describes the definition of an internet architecture and the
need for a new one, examples for a few prospective future internet architectures,
an introduction to CCN and Named-Data Networking NDN, security challenges
from the AIC triad, thesis road map, list of contributions, and the research
methodologies used in this thesis.
(b) The second chapter presents a solution to mitigate Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks to improve the availability of both the CCN network
and the information/data being transported over it.
(c) The third chapter addresses the second component of the AIC triad i.e., integrity
of content/data/information in CCN.
(d) The fourth chapter addresses the third and final component of the AIC triad
i.e., confidentiality of content/data/information in CCN by presenting a content
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name privacy protection approach using 1) name obfuscation and 2) gateway
routing.
(e) The fifth chapter bridges the technical and business evaluations through exam-
ples of three real-life case studies, translating some of the qualitative require-
ments into quantitative parameters using system dynamics modelling. This
chapter also discusses the difference between and examples of some functional
and non-functional requirements, and illustrates a few socio-economic modelling
examples for a future internet architecture using system dynamics.
(f) The sixth and final chapter concludes by summarizing the work presented in
this thesis and prospective future work in this domain.
1.7 Methodologies
For the technical contributions in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, we used ndnSIM [22]
simulations and also considered some rudimentary data input from the real world
test beds such as guifi.net [13] and TakNet [6] for ICN. For the socio-economic
analysis we used data from the technical evaluations, case studies, and interviews
for data collection and parameter identification; and Vensim [15] software for system
dynamics [5] modelling simulations and mathematical computations. Section 5.2
in Chapter 5 of this thesis introduces basic concepts used in system dynamics, and
Section 5.3 in Chapter 5 presents a modelling example using real life case studies.
1.8 List of contributions
This thesis presents two major categories of contributions. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 discuss
technical challenges in availability, integrity, and confidentiality for CCN/NDN,
whereas Chapter 5 presents the socio-economic influences on the design decisions for
a future internet architecture such as CCN.
Technical contributions
(a) Availability in CCN - Kiram and WOE: is discussed in Chapter 2. We address
the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) challenge in CCN and propose a novel
approach to mitigate it.
(b) Integrity in CCN - Content poisoning and its mitigation: is presented in
Chapter 3. We address the issue of content poisoning in CCN caused by fake
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interests, content, and signatures and its mitigation using a proposed solution
that we named Iris. We amalgamate and improvise upon the honeypot and
exclusion techniques and introduce the reverse MA-ABE technique in Iris.
Using these techniques as an intelligent framework, Iris detects the fake content
objects, identifies, and isolates the Compromised Consumers, and eventually,
the Adversarial Producers.
(c) Confidentiality in CCN - Name privacy protection: is addressed in Chapter 4
by introducing a unique solution to offer user-specific privacy protection. User’s
trade-off between privacy and utility is analyzed using game theory based
algorithms. Privacy protection is enhanced using two distinct layers using a)
partial or full name obfuscation and b) onion routing through gateways.
System dynamics modelling and its link with technical con-
tributions
The term architecture usually refers to a concrete and stable design. However, if
there is one lesson to be learnt from the current Internet evolution, it is the same
as what Heraclitus, a Greek philosopher, has been quoted as saying “change is the
only constant in life”. In other words, a future-proof internet architecture would be
one that passes the test of time and changing user needs. Another important fact to
consider is that Internet connectivity has strongly impacted the social, industrial,
agricultural, economic, educational, medical, and political aspects of human life. As
the internet itself evolves, it must also take into account the ever-changing dynamics
from all the relevant domains of life. This phenomenon can alternatively be termed
as the socio-economic aspect of a future internet design. These non-technical
aspects strongly influence the requirements that a future internet architecture must
fulfill. Some of these requirements may be functional and others non-functional; the
distinction between the two is purely contextual depending upon the application or
user requirement. Section 5.1 in Chapter 5 of this thesis provides further insight
into this topic and Table 5.1 enlists some examples. Chapter 5 introduces system
dynamics modelling to quantify the qualitative parameters that must be considered
while designing a future internet architecture. Although, it would not be completely
fair to label these contributions as non-technical because they directly take input
from and then inform the technical design via feedback: however, for the ease of
understanding we can categorize these contributions as the socio-economic evaluation
for a future internet architecture.
As described in the previous section, Chapter 2 focuses on Availability in CCN. We
address the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) challenge in CCN and propose
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Kiram and WOE as a novel approach to mitigate it. In Chapter 3, we address
the issue of Integrity by mitigating content poisoning in CCN caused by fake
interests, content, and signatures using a proposed solution that we named Iris.
Chapter 4 addresses Confidentiality in CCN- Name privacy protection is addressed
by introducing a unique solution to offer user-specific privacy protection. User’s
trade-off between privacy and utility is analyzed using game theory based algorithms.
Privacy protection is enhanced using two distinct layers using a) partial or full
name obfuscation and b) onion routing through gateways. While a DDoS attack,
content poisoning, and name privacy are technical security problems, Availability,
Integrity, and Confidentiality may be referred to as three of the most significant
non-functional security requirements (some others listed in Table 5.1 Chapter 5) of
a future internet architecture. Privacy and utility (trade-offs used in Chapter 4) are
also non-functional requirements, directly linked to technical problems and their
solution. It is also imperative to consider that in addition to being dependent on
their technical aspects, none of the non-functional or functional requirements can be
considered in isolation. They have a direct correlation with each other as well as
other parameters such as delay, user experience control, collaborative innovation, and
perception of intrusiveness as illustrated by the system dynamics models presented in
Chapter 5. In this thesis, the system dynamics modelling approach presents a unique
perspective to bridge the gap between these technical and non-technical parameters
to effectively inform the design and development of future internet architectures.
1.9 Summary
In this chapter we described the future internet architectures, CCN, and the AIC
triad, presented the thesis road map, and listed the contributions and research
methodologies used for the thesis.
Topic of the next chapter is availability in CCN, which is the first of the three AIC
concepts covered in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Availability in CCN- Kiram and
WOE
This chapter presents a solution to mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks to improve the availability of both the CCN network and the information/data
being transported over it.
2.1 Introduction
Availability is perhaps the most significant pillar of the AIC triad as it is by definition
(in terms of information security) [7] the guarantee of reliable access to the information
by authorized people. This definition itself makes it evident that availability would
be of utmost importance to every internet designer and user, irrespective of the
fact that they care about information security or not. As discussed previously in
Chapter 1 Section 1.3, security by design must be the primary consideration while
designing a future internet architecture; CCN/NDN is no exception.
As described in the previous chapter in Section 1.4, the NDN messages are classified
into two main categories namely interest and content [105]. A consumer or infor-
mation subscriber’s request is represented by an interest that specifies the desired
content by a name. The content includes name, required data object, and a digital
signature of the content producer. Names are hierarchical structures composed of
one or two components. Content is delivered to consumers only upon explicit request.
Each request corresponds to an interest message and causes NDN routers to store a
small amount of transient state in a structure called Pending Interest Table (PIT).
This information is used to route content back to consumers. Forward Information
Base (FIB) is analogous to a routing table and maps the content name and the
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network interface to be used to direct the interest message towards the content
serving node (producer or cache). Content Store (CS) is the router cache and is the
first place the router checks for content availability upon the arrival of an interest
message. If the content is not found in cache, the FIB is checked. Each time an
interest message cannot be satisfied from the cache, a record is generated in the PIT.
PIT is then checked upon arrival of a content object and the content will follow
the reverse route of the interest message. We use the term honest interest for a
normal/non-adversarial interest generated by a genuine consumer.
2.2 Denial of Service attacks in IP Based vs CCN
internet architectures
During recent years, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have become increasingly
effective against the availability of the current IP based internet.
DoS vs DDoS
The flooding traffic of a DoS attack may originate from either a single source or
multiple sources. We call the latter case a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack [101].
Types of DoS/DDoS attacks and their effectiveness in IP vs
CCN
DDoS attacks can be classified further into 1) resource exhaustion and 2) timing
attacks. Resource exhaustion attacks can be classified further into infrastructure,
source, mobile blockade (a wireless node flooding the network with interests and
then disconnecting), and flooding attacks [17].
Following are some of the renowned types [63] of DoS/DDoS attacks and their impact
on the current IP based Internet is compared with that on CCN:
2.2.1 Bandwidth Depletion attacks
In the current IP-based internet, the Bandwidth Depletion attack is usually carried
out via routing protocols such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP, etc. In a Bandwidth
Depletion DDoS attack, the adversary controls zombies to flood their victims with
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IP packets at the highest possible data rate. In case of TCP, the connection-based
nature of the protocol implies that each maliciously sent packet tries to open a
new connection, requiring the victim to create and store corresponding state, thus
resulting in exponential saturation of resources. Due to the caching in CCN, such an
attack would have limited impact. An adversary can launch a number of zombies to
request existing content from a victim. However, once the content is requested from
the producer, CCN routers will cache it and serve the later interests from the caches.
2.2.2 Reflection attacks
In a reflection attack, the adversary uses secondary victims as reflectors to target
the primary victim. The adversary sends malicious traffic (packets with the primary
victim’s address set as the source address). CCN is resilient to such attacks as the
content follows the same path in reverse of the interest. The number of content copies
a consumer can receive is limited by the number of its interfaces. The adversary can
only affect the targeted victim if it is on the same physical network.
2.2.3 Black-holing by prefix-hijacking
Black-holing through prefix-hijacking is an effective attack in IP networks as it
involves corrupting the routing information. In a black-holing via prefix hijacking [30]
attack, a malicious or compromised Autonomous System (AS) advertises invalid
routes, misguiding other autonomous systems to route their traffic to itself, acting as a
black-hole, where all the traffic sent to the malicious autonomous system is discarded.
Several mitigation techniques have been proposed [84] [129], but prefix-hijacking still
remains a serious security threat in the current internet.
CCN is more resilient to the prefix-hijacking attacks compared to the IP based
internet as the routing updates in CCN are signed and can be verified [76] except in
compromised routers. Since content follows the same path as an interest in reverse,
CCN routers can use information such as the number of unsatisfied interests at
any interface to detect if a particular prefix has been black-holed. Furthermore,
CCN routers maintain statistics about performance of each interface with respect
to a particular prefix. In case of a perceived attack, loop detection and elimination
allows redundancy through multi-path forwarding. Denial of Service (DoS) is a
routing-related security concern. An adversary could launch a DoS attack by sending
many requests to a single source for available content or sending multiple requests
for non-existent content, also termed as fake interests. A basic illustration of a DoS
attack in NDN is demonstrated in Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual illustration of a DoS attack in NDN
Figure 2.2: AT&T Network Topology (AS 7118) from the Rocketfuel data bank for the
continental US
2.2.4 Interest Flooding Attack (IFA)
Flooding a router with fake interests allows the adversary to saturate the PIT.
This has been identified in previous work under the name of Interest Flooding
Attack (IFA) [61]. In this thesis, we focus on IFA DDoS attacks only (using fake
interests). An adversary sends a large number of fake interests, i.e., requests for
non-existent/unavailable content. The CCN/NDN architecture is designed to find
the closest copy from the best available location, therefore the interests take different
routes to the content source/producer or router cache/CS, resulting in an overload
of the PIT table. If the PIT is completely full, new interests are dropped.
2.3 Related work on DDoS defence
While DDoS is a relatively new area of interest in NDN, there has been no dearth of
DDoS mitigation research for the current Internet architecture, specially since the first
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Figure 2.3: DFN Network topology with core routers (green), edge routers (red), and
consumers (blue)
DDoS attack in 1974 [11] and the large scale DDoS attacks [10] that gained attention
during the early 2000s. Mahajan et al. [91] introduced a network-based solution,
called Pushback, as an inside-the-network defence against DDoS attacks. Ioannidis
and Bellovin [79] explored this idea further in traditional Internet infrastructure.
Afanasyev et al. [20] have proposed DDoS mitigation in NDN through rate-limiting,
per-face fairness, per-face statistical analysis, and priority. It requires PIT’s extension
and storing statistics by the router, implying that the scope is individual (per router
node) as well as collaborative (network-based). Compagno et al. [45] also address
interest flooding and DDoS in NDN by proposing a mechanism named Poseidon for
detecting and mitigating interest flooding. Gasti et al. [61] and Compagno et al. [46]
proposed mitigation of interest flooding attacks in NDN by periodic monitoring of
PIT usage and interest rates. Dai et al. [50] presented a collaborative technique
between routers and producers through interest trace-back. To loosen the stress
of PIT attacked by IFA, Wang et al. [121] proposed an approach called Disabling
PIT Exhaustion (DPE) to divert all the malicious interests out of PIT by directly
recording their state information (e.g., incoming interface) in the name of each
malicious interest rather than PIT, as well as introducing a packet marking scheme
to enable data packet forwarding without the help of PIT. Wählisch et al. [119]
analysed resource exhaustion, mobile blockade, state de-correlation attacks (where
adversary compromises the content or cache by updating it at a frequency exceeding
the content request consolidation), and usage of data-driven state to launch DoS
and DDoS attacks.
The concept of intelligent learning for DDoS defence in the current Internet infras-
tructure is not new to the industrial and academic worlds. Cisco [8], Fortinet [12],
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Figure 2.4: PIT usage in the absence of an IFA
CloudFlare [9] and Akamai [24], etc., have all been using intelligent learning and
traffic pattern analysis mechanisms for anomaly detection to improve network perfor-
mance in general, and to compute DDoS defence strategies in particular, for a while.
Yuan et al. [128] presented DeepDefense, which is a recurrent deep neural network to
learn patterns from sequences of network traffic and trace network attack activities.
However most of these solutions involve large scale independent systems which 1)
first segregate the good traffic from the bad, 2) then sink-hole [100] or black-hole [25]
the suspicious traffic1 and finally, 3) execute high performance resource consuming
computations on the segregated or sink-holed traffic.
Our work compliments and builds upon some of the above mentioned DDoS mitigation
strategies by combining the traditional anti-IFA techniques with intelligent temporal
learning for anomaly detection and novel computation for alert generation and
feedback.
36
Table 2.1: Kiram computational parameters
Parameter Description
ρxht PIT space utilization for normal traffic during time
interval t
ρxat PIT space utilization for abnormal traffic during
time interval t
δx threshold discerning between normal vs abnormal
PIT size for interface x
µxh rate of outgoing content objects corresponding to
honest interests for interface x
µxa rate of outgoing content objects corresponding to
satisfied interests for interface x during an adver-
sarial attack
Γx interest rate-limiting threshold
ωxt WOE alert (with variables frequency, timestamp,
namespace and optional description link) received
from interface x during time interval t
ηxω namespace associated with WOE alert ω on inter-
face x
τxω time-stamp associated with WOE alert ω on inter-
face x
`xω frequency associated with WOE alert ω on interface
x
ζxω description link associated with WOE alert ω on
interface x
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Figure 2.5: IFA impact on PIT usage
Figure 2.6: Kiram performance over time
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2.4 The DDoS defence duo: Kiram and WOE
2.4.1 Kiram: An intelligent interest flooding detection, mit-
igation, and prevention mechanism
Kiram is our proposed framework consisting of algorithms that utilize the funda-
mental NDN principles, as well as intelligent learning mechanisms, and improvised
computations for anomaly detection. The distinguishing feature of Kiram is that in
addition to the time-interval based interest accumulation and previously introduced
Pushback [61] techniques, it also utilizes intelligent learning and computation. The
unique anomaly detection mechanism distinguishes Kiram from the previously pro-
posed anti-DDoS solutions for CCN. This mechanism enables the passive monitoring
of all traffic over time to first establish a normal (baseline) network behaviour/traffic
pattern and then compare the ongoing traffic with it.
Kiram utilizes individual (node) and cumulative (network) knowledge-base as well
as collaborative learning to prevent unknown/zero-day attacks. The normal traffic
baseline is updated incrementally using individual and collaborative router statistics.
According to the intrinsic NDN functionality, a content object follows the reverse
path of an honest interest. Following this principle, an honest interest will result
in the corresponding returned content. Kiram maintains the interest satisfaction
portfolio for each incoming interface, outgoing interface, and per-name prefix and
then compares it to previously generated baselines (from honest interest traffic
patterns).
Following anomaly detection, Kiram mitigates the effects of the attack by limiting
the interest rates on the affected interfaces. It then generates WOE (Warding Off
Evil) alerts at the first layer of defence, i.e., the first router that experiences a
flooding of the PIT. WOE also provides a feedback loop into Kiram’s intelligent
learning mechanism resulting in a collaborative and proactive defence system.
Kiram is a set of algorithms running on routers. It identifies an anomaly using an
established normal traffic pattern baseline. It then compares the baselines statistics
to the statistics recorded during the onset of an adversarial attack including expired
interests, their corresponding namespaces, and their in and out interfaces.
The next logical step after anomaly detection is to limit the interest acceptance at the
affected interface(s) as proposed in previous research works [22] [61] [79]. However,
Kiram does not stop at this step. It also generates WOE alerts as described next.
1The sink-holed traffic is usually used for analytical learning and the black-holed traffic is discarded.
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2.4.2 WOE (Warding Off Evil) real-time alerts
The second step is the WOE alert dissemination in the form of a content message.
Content Centric Networks are intrinsically characterized by the information exchange
principle of one request per packet. It has been argued by Tsilopoulos et al., that for
diverse types of traffic such as real-time streaming, one request per packet can neither
be adequate nor efficient [118]. Analyzing diverse traffic types is beyond the scope
of this thesis. However, it is noteworthy that to enable the efficient dissemination of
information for optimum CCN performance, different mechanisms must be employed
for different scenarios. An adversarial DDoS attack through interest flooding is one
such scenario.
We augmented upon the concepts of Reliable Notifications and Persistent Interests
presented by Tsilopoulos et al. [118] for the use-case of real time documents. Instead
of using these concepts for the regular content objects, we used them for the
WOE alert which is disseminated as a content packet. As argued by Compagno et
al., it is recommended to send WOE as a content packet belonging to a reserved
namespace [45]. First of the three logical reasons for sending WOE as a content
message is the full PIT in the next hop router which may result in discarding of
WOE alert, preventing it from reaching the intended and affected victims. Secondly,
the content message is signed by the producer and hence is a more reliable source
of sending an alarm compared to an interest message. Thirdly, the alert message
may be cloned by the adversary as a fake interest and used as an additional weapon
during an ongoing DDoS attack.
Based on the idea of “self-certifying alerts” for malware detection and containment
introduced by Costa et al. [49], we can sign the WOE alert content message with a
link to a description of the warning or alert. This tactic is aligned with our strategy
of intelligent anomaly detection in which WOE acts as a real time warning, as well
as a future prevention tool by contributing back to the Kiram knowledge-base.
Router rx (where r denotes the router and x denotes the particular interface of that
router for routing of the interest or content message under observation), receives
a packet (cont1) and processes it as detailed in Algorithm 1. A persistent interest
flooding attack on router rx causes it to send multiple alert messages towards the
source(s) of the attack. Such sources will decrease their thresholds Γx and δx until
they detect the attack and implement rate limiting on the malicious interests. If no
attack is reported for a predefined amount of time, thresholds are restored to their
original values.
This push-back mechanism allows routers that are not the target of the attack, but
are unwittingly forwarding malicious interests, to detect interest flooding early. In
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particular, alert messages allow routers to detect interest flooding even when they
are far away from the intended victim, i.e., close to nodes controlled by the adversary,
where countermeasures are most effective.
Algorithm 1 Processing data message and WOE alert ωxt
Input : Incoming packet cont1 from rx, waittime, Γ
x (interest rate-limiting threshold),
δx (threshold discerning between normal vs abnormal PIT size for interface x), Alert
message ωxt from interface x.
1: if cont1 is ContentObject then
2: process cont1 as ContentObject and return
3: if cont1 is ωxt then
4: Verify (cont1.signature)
5: if IsFresh (cont1) and time from last Alert received from rx > waittime then
6: Decrease Γx
7: Decrease δx
8: else drop message (cont1)
9: if cont1 is interest then
10: if µxa is > Γ
x and ρxat is > δ
x then
11: drop message
12: if time from last Alert sent on interface x > waittime then
13: send alert ωxt to rx
14: else process cont1 as interest
2.5 Evaluation
We used ndnSIM [22], the open source NS-3 based NDN simulator for simulations to
evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed framework. While in the future, NDN may
lead to different topology networks, it is hard to predict what those would look like.
So for now using standard baseline comparison networks such as the AT&T and
DFN (German Research Network) [75] could safely be assumed as the best practice.
AT&T and DFN network topology networks were chosen for keeping the simulations
realistic.
2.5.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are used in our evaluation:
(a) Kiram is implemented on all NDN routers in the system under evaluation for
both AT&T and DFN topologies used for simulations.
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(b) The NDN routers are not compromised by the adversary during the Interest
Flooding DDoS attack.
(c) In our simulations we assumed that all users send their Interest packets at
constant average rates with randomized time gap between two consecutive
Interests, because this traffic pattern provides a reasonable approximation of
traffic mix from all users without excessive buffering. The content distributions
of each legitimate user and attacker follow Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution [92]
and uniform distribution respectively, which have been implemented in the
latest ndnSIM module.
(d) All NDN routing features are functional on the routers, implying that the NDN
routers can easily keep track of unsatisfied (expired) interests and use this
information to limit the following:
i. The number of pending interests per outgoing interface: NDN keeps flow
balance between interests and content. For each interest sent through
a particular path, at most one content satisfying that interest can flow
in the opposite direction on the exact reverse (return) path. Based on
that property, each router can compute the maximum number of pending
interests per outgoing interface that the return connection can satisfy before
they time out. Thus, a router should never send more interests than an
interface can satisfy, based on average content package size, timeout for
interests and bandwidth-delay product for the corresponding link.
ii. The number of interests per incoming interface: Using the same flow balance
principle, a router can easily detect when a consumer is sending too many
interests that cannot be satisfied due to the physical limitations of the link.
iii. The number of pending interests per namespace: When a certain prefix
is under attack, intervening routers can easily detect out-of-proportion
numbers of unsatisfied interests in their PIT for that prefix. Thus, routers
can limit the total number of pending interests for that prefix and block
the incoming interface(s) which has sent too many unsatisfied interests for
that same prefix.
(e) In a real life Interest Flooding DDoS attack, the adversary may be able to
poison the cache contents of routers, thus launching a simultaneous content
poisoning attack, which is also discussed in the next chapter. Additionally, in a
real life scenario, various types of DDoS attacks mentioned earlier in Section 2.2
may be launched alongside an IFA. However, we are only simulating Interest
Flooding DDoS attacks in isolation to ensure a thorough evaluation of the
proposed mitigation technique. The assumption that only the interest and not
42
the content messages can be tampered with by the adversary, also allows us
to share the WOE alert as a content message, ensuring that it is signed and
cannot be compromised unlike the fake interest messages.
2.5.2 Simulations
The DFN topology as depicted in Fig. 2.3 had 16 Consumers and 30 NDN routers. To
check the sensitivity and accuracy of the results, we varied the number of Producers
from 1 to 5, number of Consumers and observed routers from 10 to 20, and the
number of adversaries from 1 to 5. The sensitivity analysis showed that 5 Producers,
14 honest routers, 14 honest consumers and 3 Adversaries was the optimum number
to effectively showcase the successful results of the experiments. Therefore, these
were the selected numbers finally used and reported in the results. Based on the
same practise of showcasing the results in the most optimum way, the simulation
system for the AT&T set up included 5 Producers, 14 Honest Consumers and 3
Adversaries. Results in Fig. 2.6 are displayed using an average from the AT&T
and DFN topology network simulations. The producers are denoted by Pn. The
honest routers are denoted by Rh and the honest consumers are denoted by Ch. The
adversaries are A1, A2 and A3.
The first set of simulations was used to verify the effects of an adversarial attack.
For this purpose the initial simulations were run on the AT&T and DFN network
topologies separately using ndnSIM with no adversarial activity. In the next set of
simulations for both AT&T and DFN network topologies, the adversaries A1, A2
and A3 start generating fake interests. The initial set of experiments endorsed the
idea that successful IFA DDoS attacks can be easily carried out using very small
amounts of bandwidth. PIT usage was significantly affected during an IFA attack as
illustrated in Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5. During the attack, several routers were impacted
significantly depicting an average of 27% (ranging from 18% to 64% depending on the
routing distance from adversarial activity) of the regular routed traffic throughput.
The parameters were varied based on the sensitivity analysis carried out during
each set of simulations. Each variable was varied independently (one variable changed
while others remained constant) in ascending order. For example, to evaluate the Γx
rate-limiting threshold calculated by µxh : µ
x
a was varied from 0.1 to 0.2, 0.3,0.4,...up
to 1.0 as the DDoS attack becomes aggressive and then the mitigation through Kiram
becomes effective overtime. We argue that neither increasing Γx, nor computing
µxh or µ
x
a over longer intervals, produces the indented effects. In fact, in the first
case the bound must be set high enough to avoid classification of short burst of
interests as attacks; however this could inevitably lead to late or non-detection of
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actual attacks. Increasing the size of the interval over which Γx is computed may
reduce the sensitivity of Kiram to short burst of interests. An interval length similar
or longer than the average round-trip time of interest/content packet, in-fact, may
allow (part of) the content requested by the burst to be forwarded back, reducing µxa
to a value closer to 1. However, this could significantly increase the detection time.
Instead, to improve detection accuracy (distinguishing naturally occurring burst
of interests from attacks), Kiram also takes into account δx. This value measures
the PIT space used by interests coming from a particular interface x. This allows
Kiram to maintain the number of false positives low – when compared to considering
solely µxa, while allowing it to detect low-rate interest flooding. In a low-rate interest
flooding attack, the adversary limits the rate of fake interests to keep µxa below its
thresholds. Monitoring the content of the PIT allows Kiram to observe the effects of
the attack, rather than just its causes, allowing for early detection.
To sum up, different parameters monitored by Kiram act as weights and counter-
weights for interest flooding detection. When a router is unable to satisfy incoming
interests over a relatively short period, ρxat may exceed the detection threshold but µ
x
a
will not; when the router receives a short bursts of interests, µxa may become larger
than Γx but the PIT usage will likely be within normal values. To stay undetected,
an adversary willing to perform interest flooding must therefore: (1) reduce the rate
at which it sends interests, which limits the effects of the attack; and/or (2) restrict
the attack to short burst, which makes the attack ineffective. Thresholds ρxat and Γ
x
are not constant and may change over time to accommodate different conditions of
the network. The time interval and the results which showed maximum variation in
the results were reported. Each simulation was carried out 20 times initially, and
after calculating averages for regular intervals of simulation repeats i.e. 5, 10, 15,
and 20 times, it was observed that 15 was an optimum number of simulations to
report consistent results effectively. Hence for all experiments, each simulation was
carried out 15 times and the average results are represented in Fig. 2.6.
All routers used in the evaluation implement Kiram. Once a router detected an
adversarial IFA from one or more interfaces using baseline comparison, the interest
acceptance from the suspicious interface(s) was restricted. Kiram’s ability to learn
the normal traffic patterns over time is directly proportional to the extent of learning
time. This hypothesis is proven by extensive simulations of an adversarial attack
first in the absence and then in the presence of Kiram, on day 1, day 5, and day 10.
For evaluation, the adversarial interference was only carried out on days 1, 5, and 10.
The time period in between was used by Kiram on an average of twelve hours per
day for ten days to build up the intelligent learning information. Kiram utilizes the
normal/honest interest rates, interface, and namespace information to establish the
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normal baseline. Baseline comparison is carried out in addition to the per incident
and per interface parameters such as size of PIT, rate of interests (for a given time
interval), and variation of interest magnitude during two time intervals, etc. Kiram
improved the throughput during an effective DDoS attack to an average of 38.2% on
day 1, 72.5% on day 5 and 94.4% on day 10. These results clearly show that the
Kiram and WOE duo provides a solid defence against DDoS attacks in NDN and
improve the network availability substantially.
Additionally, the temporal learning capability reduces the probability of false positives
by recognizing the common network occurrences such as packet loss, non-adversarial
congestion, and hardware and software errors. Kiram detects attacks by using the
parameters listed in Table 2.1. All of the parameters (except thresholds which are
calculated based on the comparison between honest/normal and adversarial/abnormal
traffic data) have two sets of values for any interface at any given time. One is the
honest traffic behaviour representation (depicted by subscript h) and the other is
the adversarial or fake interest representation (depicted by subscript a).
2.6 Conclusion
Kiram offers intelligent anomaly detection by learning normal traffic patterns to
establish a baseline. In the advent of an adversarial interest flooding DDoS attack,
it mitigates the effects by limiting interest rates on affected interfaces and generates
WOE alerts to neighbouring routers as a collaborative countermeasure. Kiram
amalgamates a novel intelligent temporal learning capability with traditional DDoS
mitigation techniques such as PIT saturation monitoring, interface rate-limiting,
namespace book-keeping and alert generation. WOE alerts from neighbouring routers
also provide feedback loops into Kiram. Extensive simulations show significant
improvement in Kiram’s effectiveness over time. Kiram and WOE could prove to be
front-runners in future work to mitigate DDoS attacks in CCN/NDN.
In this chapter the focus was on IFA DDoS attacks. Some other DDoS attacks such
as Bandwidth Depletion attack, Reflection attack and Black-holing prefix-hijacking
are mentioned in Section 2.2. For future work we can run ndnSIM simulations for
these attacks as well as do real life testing for Kiram for IFA DDoS attacks. Since
Kiram is a temporal learning mechanism, a larger network and longer learning time
may reveal further benefits of this approach. Further work can also be done to equip
the alert message called WOE with more effective and meaningful information.
In this chapter we discussed the DDoS attacks in CCN as a threat to availability of con-
tent/data and presented Kiram as a defence mechanism. The next chapter addresses
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Integrity in CCN- Content
poisoning and its mitigation
The previous chapter discussed the availability in CCN and presented Kiram as
a defence mechanism against DDoS attacks. This chapter considers the second
component of the AIC triad, i.e., integrity of content/data/information in CCN, by
addressing the challenge of content poisoning and proposing its mitigation through
a novel solution named Iris.
As discussed previously in Chapter 1 Section 1.5, integrity [7] is the assurance that
the information is trustworthy and accurate. This definition also clearly shows the
strong interdependence of availability, integrity, and confidentiality of information
upon each other. When an adversary attempts to compromise the integrity of data,
she tampers with the data to corrupt it enough to either make it useless for the
user or useful to herself for malicious purposes such as injecting a worm or trojan or
providing false information for social/political gains such as propaganda.
3.1 Content poisoning
As previously discussed in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1, NDN routers maintain Content
Stores (CS)s to enable efficient distribution of popular content through caching. This
caching is a key CCN feature that reduces latency, improves bandwidth utilization,
and ensures swift content delivery. However, content caching is susceptible to
content pollution, content poisoning, and content snooping attacks [96]. Locality
disruption [52] attacks continuously generate requests for new unpopular files, thus
ruining the cache file locality. False locality attacks [52] repeatedly request the same
set of files, thus creating a false file locality at proxy caches. It is noteworthy that
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through the injection of fake content, the adversary can achieve much more: the
adversary may inject fake content to build a false locality as a large storage network
to store junk and malicious content such as malware and trojans, etc.
3.2 Related work
A big share of CCN security research done so far has focused on Denial-of-Service
attacks [63] [45]. However, cache poisoning also known as cache pollution attacks
pose an equal, if not a greater challenge for the NDN architectures. Content poisoning
is an attack during which an adversary injects fake (junk or planted on purpose)
content into the NDN network with the intent of polluting the router caches. First,
such attacks are stealth in nature, i.e., they are capable of degrading overall network
performance without flooding network resources. Second, they possess a dangerous
level of indirection, i.e., while both consumers and CS are affected by the attack,
neither consumers nor CS are directly attacked. Third, they pollute the cache with
unwanted content, which appears to be harmless as it is either simply useless or is
skilfully hiding malware, making these attacks much harder to detect. Finally, no
counter-poisoning mechanisms exist in internet caches; thus, even simple, brute-force
poisoning attacks can be quite successful.
While some caching systems do apply simple mechanisms to mitigate the effects
of unintentional cache poisoning, such mechanisms are fundamentally limited in
their ability to thwart systematic, and intentional poisoning attacks. While being
much more effective, such attacks are much harder to detect. CCN Cache poison-
ing/pollution attacks are investigated by Xie et al. [127] and CacheShield is proposed
as a proactive mechanism. Conti et al.’s work [48] proves the inefficacy of CacheShield
against realistic adversaries. Our work addresses the limitations of CacheShield by
proposing a realistic defence mechanism that identifies and mitigates a systematic
content poisoning attack from a realistic adversary in a fairly realistic topology.
Moreover, in contrast with Ghali et al. [66] using a ranking system for unsatisfied or
rejected content for exclusion, and Mauri et al. [94] proposing a honeypot mechanism
for blacklisting fake content, we propose a more evolved, improvised, and intelligent
framework called Iris that uses the concept of reverse attribute based encryption in
addition to the traditional exclusion and honeypot techniques.
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Figure 3.1: AT&T Network Topology (AS 7118) from the Rocketfuel data bank for the
continental US.
3.2.1 Fake content and fake signatures
A fake content is a content injected by an adversary with malicious intention.
Ghali [66] identifies a fake content as one having a fake signature. A fake signature
is a content signature with any one of the following characteristics:
(a) It maybe an invalid signature.
(b) It maybe a valid signature with a key not belonging to the producer.
(c) It maybe an ill-formatted signature.
3.3 Evaluation
For this thesis, we examined a planned content poisoning attack in which an adversary
infers the interests for content names and injects fake content of the same name in
the cache.
To quantify the effectiveness of our proposed framework named Iris, ndnSIM [22],
the open source NS-3 based NDN simulator was used for simulations.
3.3.1 Network topologies
We used the AT&T (AS 7118) [37] from the Rocketfuel data bank and DFN topologies
for the ndnSIM simulations. One of the reasons for choosing AT&T and DFN
topologies was that whereas NDN may lead to different topology networks in future,
it is hard to predict what those would look like. Hence, using standard baseline
comparison networks such as the AT&T and DFN can be safely assumed as the
best practice for now. Secondly, we chose these topologies to keep the simulations
realistic. Following are some definitions of the entities used in our experiments:
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Figure 3.2: DFN Network Topology. Red dots depict edge routers, blue are consumers,
and green are core routers
Figure 3.3: DFN Topology results with different rates of pre-populated fake content objects
(NW: NDN without Iris, NI: NDN with Iris, PCF: % of pre-populated fake content objects)
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Figure 3.4: DFN topology results with different rates of malicious consumers and 99%
pre-populated fake content objects (NW: NDN without Iris, NI: NDN with Iris, PM:
percentage of malicious nodes in the consumer population)
(a) An adversarial producer is a producer that generates fake content and injects it
in the NDN network. For our experiments, we consider an adversary which is
capable of creating a false locality with an ultimate goal to poison the end user
storage. The adversary has the capability to compromise a number of consumer
nodes and use them to request the fake content objects.
(b) An honest consumer is not satisfied with the fake content object. An honest
consumer would exclude the name of the fake content and Iris keeps the log for
this exclusion. Also, an honest consumer stops sending the relevant interest
messages once the required valid content is received.
(c) A compromised consumer acts on behalf of the adversary. The compromised
consumer would exclude the interests returning valid content and would request
fake content.
The DFN topology as depicted in Fig.3.2 had 16 consumers and 30 NDN routers.
To check the sensitivity and accuracy of results, we varied the number of observed
producers from 1 to 5, number of observed honest consumers and observed routers
from 10 to 20, number of compromised consumers from 1 to 10, and the number of
adversaries from 1 to 5. The sensitivity analysis’ showed that 5 honest producers,
14 honest consumers and 6 compromised consumers controlled by one adversarial
producer were the optimum system parameters to effectively showcase the successful
results of the experiments. Hence, these were the selected numbers finally used and
reported in the results. The one adversarial producer is denoted by PA. The honest
producers are denoted by Px, where x varies from 1 to 5. The routers in the AT&T
and DFN topologies are denoted by Rn where n varies from 1 to 132 for AT&T and
1 to 30 for DFN.
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The honest consumers are denoted by Chm where m varies from 1 to 14. We use Ch5
and Ch12 as Monitored Consumers (MCs) to observe network behaviour through the
experiments. Compromised consumers controlled by the PA are denoted by CA1, CA2,
CA3, CA4, CA5, and CA6.
F is a set of fake content objects that is injected in the network by PA.
In a real-life content poisoning attack, the fake content may originate from multiple
sources. However, for the sake of experimental simplicity, we simulated an attack
using only one adversary.
3.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
Since there are various variables involved in our evaluations, we used a sensitivity
analysis technique. This technique was based on keeping all variables except one
constant at any given time to determine the impact of changing values of that specific
variable over a range of values. This variation allowed us to determine the optimal
value range that best demonstrated the impact of changing values of one specific
variable. This process was repeated for every variable that we have evaluated.
For example, in the simulations discussed in this chapter, the percentage of pre-
populated fake content objects, number of honest consumers, percentage of malicious
nodes in consumer population, the number of routers to be monitored, and the
number of adversarial producers, etc., were all subjected to this sensitivity analysis
to determine the optimum range of variation in values to be reported.
3.3.3 Simulations
The first set of simulations was used to verify the effects of an adversarial attack. For
this purpose, the simulation was initially run on the AT&T and DFN topologies using
ndnSIM with no adversarial activity. In the next set of simulations, PA generated fake
content. Initially the simulations were carried out 10 times (as that has traditionally
been the minimum number of simulation sets in ndnSIM experiments). From 10 to 20
simulation sets, it was observed through sensitivity analysis that 14 simulations were
the optimum number of simulations to report the results most effectively. Hence,
each simulation was ultimately carried out 14 times and the average results were
obtained by monitoring Ch5 and Ch12. Table 3.1 shows the topology parameters,
whereas the simulation results are depicted in Fig. 3.2, Fig. 3.3, Fig. 3.4 for DFN
topology and in Fig. 3.5 for AT&T topology.
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3.3.4 Iris: Cure for content poisoning
Iris helps classify a content as fake by utilizing an attribute based classification. This
attribute of a content being fake is determined using the following four thresholds
with priority high to low, with (a) being the highest and (d) being the lowest:
(a) A content is most likely to be classified as fake if it has fake signatures. A
signature can be declared fake based on the criteria described earlier in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, i.e., it may be 1) an invalid signature, 2) a valid signature with a
key not belonging to the producer, and/or 3) an ill-formatted signature.
(b) A content can be declared fake if it has a high dissatisfied interest count. (In
this evaluation we varied the dissatisfied interest counter from 5 to 13).
(c) A fake content object may also be identified by the idle time it spends in the
cache.
(d) Once a fake content is identified along with its corresponding adversarial
producer PA, the content’s reappearance from PA can also be used to establish
the attribute again after some time has lapsed. This is the lowest priority
criterion, as it would only be evident once the content poisoning attack has been
detected and monitored to be effective for some time. Moreover, detecting the
original adversarial producer and retaining that information over time requires
greater router overhead.
3.3.5 Multi-Authority Attribute Based Encryption (MA-ABE)
Based on the nature of most NDN architectures, it is difficult to agree on a single
trusted authority that issues attributes for all the users. Therefore, Iris’ second level
of defence against content poisoning attacks is based on multi-authority attribute
based encryption (MA-ABE) [87]. MA-ABE decentralizes the trust by allowing
several independent authorities to issue decryption keys corresponding to different
attributes. This allows maximum flexibility as required by the NDN architecture.
The reason we applied the MA-ABE concept in reverse for Iris is because every node
in the network chooses its trusted authorities before it joins the network. The initial
trust relationship between a node and its authorities is established by default. We
can assume two scenarios:
(a) In the first scenario, MA-ABE is already in place, i.e., the nodes initially
establish an out-of-band trust by exchanging secret keys. In this scenario,
Iris can revoke the key of identified adversarial producers or compromised
consumers.
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(b) In the second scenario, where the trust relationship is not established, Iris
can perform the identification and exclusion based on the criteria listed above.
Once a producer and compromised nodes are identified, access to content can
be restricted by using the attribute qualifying the producers and consumers as
honest by virtue of lack of the fake attribute.
3.3.6 Iris in action
(a) The first step in content poisoning mitigation is to evaluate the content and
classify it as fake based on the criteria mentioned in Section 3.2.1 and specified
in the below mentioned Algorithm 2 as Conditions 1 to 4.
Conditions for adding attribute f (fake) to content c x and corresponding interest
i x are the following:
Condition 1: Content has an invalid signature, a valid signature with a key not
belonging to the producer, and/or an ill-formatted signature.
Condition 2: Content’s dissatisfied interest count > 5.
Condition 3: Content’s idle time > 15 sec.
Condition 4: Content’s reappearance from PA within 10 sec of being dropped
as idle from PIT.
Algorithm 2 Attribute addition and response for fake content
Input : Condition 1 or Condition 2, Condition 3 and Condition 2
Output : forward message or drop message and log PA, interface and δ
1: if Condition 1 =true ∨ Condition 2 =true
2: then
3: check for Condition 3 and Condition 4
4: if Condition 3 ∧ Condition 4 = true then
5: cx = ch and ix = ih
6: forward message
7: else
8: if cx =cf and ix = if then
9: drop message return log PA,
10: update interface and δ
(b) The second step is to mitigate the ongoing compromise by adding the attribute
fake to the corresponding relaying interface(s).
(c) The third step is to identify the compromised consumers, and eventually the
adversarial producer, and revoke the access keys for these nodes.
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Table 3.1: ndnSIM AT&T and DFN Topology Parameters
Parameter AT&T simulations DFN simulations
No. of Ch 14 16
No. of Rn 132 30
No. of PA 1 1
No. of Px 5 5
No. of simulations 14 14
Simulation time [sec] 300 300
Fake content rate injection 0% to 70% in 5% intervals 0% to 70% in 5% intervals
No. of CA 6 6
No. of MCs 2 2
CA rate 0%, to 30% in 5% intervals 0%, to 30% in 5% intervals
Interest interval [millisec] [100,300] [100,300]
It is noteworthy that until a content poisoning attack is detected (based on the
presence of fake content identified using the criteria mentioned earlier), the content
producers determine the access control policy. Once a content poisoning attack is
detected, Iris acts as a function that accepts a consumer identity and the associated
attribute and outputs honest denoted by h if the consumer satisfies the input
attribute (i.e., absence of the attribute fake denoted by f ). The presence of attribute
f confirms that the customer is requesting fake content and/or the producer is
relaying fake content. In other words, Iris starts functioning as the access control
provider by managing and relaying the access control policy.
Iris was implemented on all nodes used in the evaluation for both AT&T and DFN
topologies. Once a node detected the existence of a content poisoning attack based on
the relaying of fake content objects from one or more interfaces, the countermeasure
Iris is activated as depicted by Algorithm 2, mitigating further propagation of fake
content.
3.3.7 Significance of the results
As described in the earlier Section 3.3.3, the initial set of simulations was run to
establish the impact of an active content poisoning adversarial attack. These initial
simulations proved that a successful content poisoning attack, if left unchecked, results
in a significant increase in the adversarial producer’s activity and the percentage of
fake contents received by the honest consumers, as depicted in Fig. 3.5 for AT&T
topology and Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 for DFN toplogy.
After establishing the impact of the adversarial content poisoning attack without
any mitigation, the next set of simulations was carried out by implementing the
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Figure 3.5: Evaluation results for Iris simulations on AT&T topology
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proposed solution, i.e., Iris. Both AT&T and DFN topologies were again used for
these simulations.
As depicted in Fig. 3.3, once Iris was implemented on all nodes in the simulations for
the DFN topology, the fake content objects were detected as soon as the percentage
of compromised consumers increased beyond 30% on average, while percentage of
pre-populated fake content objects (denoted by PCF) was varied from 80% to 95%
with increments of 5% each time (a difference determined by the sensitivity analysis
as mentioned in Section 3.3.2).
In another set of simulations depicted in Fig. 3.4 for DFN topolgy, the percentage of
malicious nodes (denoted by PM) was varied from 0% to 10%, with and without
Iris, which showed significant mitigation of fake content object propagation by Iris,
specifically when percentage of fake content received by honest consumers rose above
20%. The maximum mitigation is seen when the fake content objects’ percentage rose
above 40% (on average) depending on the varying percentage of malicious consumers
and a 99% injection rate of pre-populated fake content objects As depicted in the
Fig. 3.5, NW denotes NDN without Iris, NI denotes NDN with Iris, and PM denotes
the percentage of malicious nodes in the consumer population.
Once Iris was implemented on all nodes in the simulations for the AT&T topology,
the fake content objects were detected as soon as the number of compromised
consumers increased beyond 3 and fake content objects’ percentage rose above 20%
as illustrated in Fig. 3.5.
These numerical results from simulations run on both AT&T and DFN topologies
clearly demonstrate that the proposed framework Iris provides a solid defence
mechanism against systematic adversarial content poisoning attacks in NDN and
substantially improves the network availability.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we explored the content poisoning attack in NDN and its mitigation
through a proposed framework named Iris. We amalgamated and improvised upon
the honeypot and exclusion techniques and introduced the reverse MA-ABE technique
in Iris. Using these techniques in an intelligent framework, Iris detects the fake
content objects, identifies, and isolates the compromised consumers, and eventually,
the adversarial producers. We used AT&T and DFN topology simulations over
ndnSIM and demonstrated the effectiveness of Iris through extensive simulations.
Future work in this area includes extension of trust federations in Iris and its
57
implementation in other CCN networks. Moreover, we continue to pursue the
scalability of Iris through large scale deployments.
Integrity preservation of content in CCN (through mitigation of adversarial content
poisoning) was explored in this chapter. The next chapter presents a solution to
ensure data confidentiality from a content name privacy perspective.
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Chapter 4
Confidentiality in CCN- Name
privacy protection
The previous two chapters presented potential solutions to 1) ensure availability and
2) protect the integrity of information in CCN. This chapter addresses the third and
final component of the AIC triad, i.e., confidentiality of content/data/information in
CCN.
Based on the“security by design” principle and our learning experiences from the
current Internet architecture, it seems imperative that we amalgamate necessary
security provisions in the nascent stages of the CCN architecture development.
Undoubtedly, confidentiality has always been the most researched field of the AIC
triad. As described earlier in Chapter 1 Section 1.5, confidentiality [7] stands for
a set of directives that prevent the exposure of data to unauthorized parties by
governing and limiting access to it. The core idea that makes confidentiality exciting
and relevant to a wide variety of audience ranging from a computer scientist to a
common internet user is “privacy”. Privacy is an integral aspect of confidentiality.
Privacy by design [85] is a technological design framework [74] and is a natural exten-
sion of security by design. Privacy by design ensures that the internet architecture
is designed and developed with built-in privacy considerations, instead of privacy
being an afterthought.
As discussed in the previous chapters, CCN/NDN’s named-content based design
makes it vulnerable to threats such as DDoS [20, 88], cache poisoning [83, 67, 106],
cache pollution [102, 94], timing-based side channel [40, 18, 47], censorship, and
anonymity attacks [29, 56, 60, 53, 40, 86]. In spite of the remedies such as secure
naming, routing, and forwarding [125, 23, 107], privacy vulnerabilities caused by the
name-to-content binding and pervasive caching features of NDN are still a massive
challenge [69, 68, 19].
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In NDN, name privacy is an important issue since the default structure of NDN works
based on content names which are human readable and reveal plenty of information
about the requested content and users’ interests. The name of a content can be used
as a highly acclaimed piece of sensitive information (of political, religious, and social
interest) by an adversary. This information can also be exploited for user profiling
to enforce censorship or pursue advertisement objectives.
Encrypting each NDN message is a promising approach for preserving name privacy
in NDN. However, a naive adaptation of encryption obviates the benefit of caching.
Although several previous studies [33, 126, 40] addressed the problem, they suffer
from either information leakage because of weak privacy protection or inefficient
routing and inability to use pervasive caching features because of strong privacy
protection. To overcome these contradictory problems, we introduced a new two-
layer privacy protection mechanism which is based on the users' choice of privacy
level. In the first layer of protection, names are encrypted using Message-locked
encryption (MLE) [32], which obfuscates sensitive and human readable names from
NDN messages. However, simple adaptation of MLE may enable adversaries to link
identical obfuscated names to a specific user or group of users by side-channel attack
(because encrypted names would be the same if the original names are the same). To
overcome this problem, the encrypted name from the first privacy protection layer is
re-encrypted and delivered using onion routing [116]/ gateways in the second layer.
Thus, adversaries are prevented from linking the requests (names) to the specific
users.
However, the encryption layers may impose extra burden on the users and networks
especially for data that is not sensitive for the users. It must be noted that there is
a certain cost associated with obfuscation, encryption, decryption, and routing etc.,
as with any privacy protection technique. Therefore, the user must be able to decide
to accept this cost depending upon the sensitivity level of information (e.g., the risk
posed by the discovery of her potential association with the desired content by an
adversary). User’s selected privacy protection level(s) may or may not include the
first and/or second layers of encryption. The user’s choice is based on sensitivity
of data and determined by game theory application. Using game theory, the user
determines the optimum level of privacy by balancing/trading off the desired level of
privacy with the utility cost.
The main contributions described in this chapter are summarized below:
(a) The proposed protection method considers information leakage for a name as
well as correlation between two similar names.
(b) We considered two layers of privacy protection to provide granular and bespoke
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name privacy for NDN users. The first layer of protection prevents information
leakage (deducible from the content name) using MLE based name obfuscation.
The second layer of protection avoids linkage between two similar names and
users by using gateways and onion routing.
(c) The hierarchical structure of the name is preserved and the ubiquitous in-
network caching is used along with the proposed privacy protection.
(d) User controlled privacy protection is determined based on game theory to
optimize utility cost against privacy.
(e) Scalability is duly considered to ensure that the proposed approach works
equally well on real-world large scale network topologies.
4.1 Related work
With pervasive eavesdropping and monitoring now being considered a serious
threat [58] and the growing increase in large-scale network packet interception
by unauthorized entities, privacy must be a necessary feature for emerging pro-
tocols. To counter such privacy threats, ubiquitous and opportunistic encryption
protocols are being standardized for IP-based protocols such as TCP and DNS,
etc. [34] [130] [35]. However, there are few works aimed towards this goal in NDN.
NDN privacy concerns can be broadly categorized into three domains, namely 1)
user/consumer privacy, 2) producer privacy, and 3) content cache privacy. Different
kind of attacks such as naming, monitoring, censorship, and timing attacks can
endanger the privacy of users and providers [117]. The name of the requested mes-
sages (interest messages) can itself reveal ample information about the content that
a user has requested and hence endanger users' privacy. Therefore, in this thesis, we
concentrate on users' privacy with the perspective of content name privacy which
is a significant issue in NDN. Since the proposed name privacy protection is based
on convergent encryption, we review the previous name privacy methods in NDN
and then discuss the convergent encryption based methods, which are used in cloud
database.
4.1.1 Name privacy in NDN
Using obfuscation [74] as a privacy mechanism, the privacy and utility experience of
a user are at odds with each other. Utility loss due to obfuscation can be termed
as the degradation of the user's service-quality expectation resulting from sharing
obscured data which needs processing time to reveal the actual data.
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There are two noteworthy metrics proposed in privacy literature. Differential
privacy limits the information leakage through observation. However, it does not
reflect the absolute privacy level of the user, i.e., what actually is learned about
the user’s secret. Distortion privacy (inference error) metric overcomes this issue
and measures the error of inferring user's secret from observation. This requires
assumption of a prior knowledge which enables quantification of absolute privacy,
but is not robust to adversaries with arbitrary knowledge. Hence, neither of these
metrics alone is capable of providing adequate privacy.
As pointed by Ghodsi et al. [70], although there has been ample discussion about
how ICN changes the security model from securing the communication path to
securing the content, there has not been enough focus on the challenges that ICN
privacy model presents due to the intrinsic name-based identification of content.
Arianfar presented an initial design [29] where users and providers collude to prevent
detection of access to “forbidden” content. Since the ICN approach results in content
arriving from network elements other than the originating server, the security model
cannot be based on the source or destination; instead, ICN designs must secure the
content rather than the path, as suggested by Walfish et al. [120] and Wendland
et al. [122]. Even the critics of ICN designs, showing less faith in ICN's ability to
improve network performance [70] have pointed out that ICN designs might bring
benefits such as more secure network configuration, intrinsic routing stability, and
protection against denial-of-service.
Systems such as Tor [116] and Freenet [44] provide anonymity for users. However,
they require substantial infrastructure investment. In addition, they do not prevent
watchlist attacks: they prevent the adversary from knowing who asked for a given
object, not which object was requested. Approaches such as broadcast encryption [59]
effectively preserve the privacy of content, but they require information to be shared
between publishers/producers and end users/consumers.
Bernardini et al. proposed a scheme named PrivICN which protects name and
content confidentiality and also preserves in-network caching [33]. This method is
based on the proxy encryption scheme and the Key Management Server (KMS)
which is the fully trusted party and generates one master key and multiple pairs of
client/proxy key for each client. However, in this method if a client colludes with
the proxy, she can access the master key and decode all the messages. Based on a
centralized key management system, this method also presents the risk of a single
point of failure. Moreover, this method is primarily for the intra-domain; for it to
work between two domains, the message needs to be decrypted and re-encrypted
with the master key of the new domain. However, in this case, the junction node
accesses the real name and data.
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Chaabane et al. discuss various privacy threats and some potential countermeasures
for Content-Oriented Networking (CON) [40]; they also discussed the name privacy
issues raised by the human readable feature of a CON name and correlation between
the name and its corresponding content. Broder et al. introduced the bloom-filter
based scheme using a hierarchical bloom-filter as the router storage and the routing
table [36]. In this method, the client computes the hierarchical bloom-filter of the
name, and her request in the obfuscated form. When a router receives the request,
it checks the last filter containing an exact match with the stored name in its cache.
If the router finds the exact match, it will return the corresponding data to the user.
Although this method also uses name obfuscation to provide privacy, the bloom-filter
scheme suffers from high false positive error rate and needs frequently resetting.
Wood and Christopher introduced TRAPS [126] which is an application-transport
protocol and provides opportunistic encryption for all data in NDN. TRAPS is built
based on knowing the name to access data and relies on the establishment of a secure
session between users and producers. However, since TRAPS is based on MLE, it
is only secure for unpredictable names. Therefore, an attacker who can predict or
estimate commonly used names can compromise users' privacy. Although the author
uses the salt generation mechanism to prevent dictionary attacks, it is not clear how
the attacker cannot access the mechanism already accessible by all other authorized
users.
4.1.2 Convergent encryption based method
The default architecture of NDN uses application name to transfer interest and data
messages. However, application names reveal information about requested data and
users' interest which endanger users' privacy. Therefore, to provide some level of
privacy, we should convert human readable application names to random strings
which are still routable through NDN.
The method that seems compatible with NDN features is MLE based on Convergent
Encryption (CE) which uses the message itself to generate the key, therefore, the
same messages have the same key and the same ciphertext [32]. MLE is used in the
cloud storage to save space by reducing redundant data and providing deduplication.
Since in NDN, the same request (including the same name) should look the same after
encryption, to fetch the same data in NDN caches, MLE seems to compliment NDN
and to be suitable for obfuscating names with considering NDN features. However,
in MLE method, the attackers who can access the name (data) can generate the
key related to that name. Moreover, MLE is susceptible to brute force attacks
(dictionary attacks). Keelveedhi et al. introduced DupLESS to improve the MLE
63
method with the aid of the key server to generate key from the message and the
secret key which belongs to the server [82]. DupLESS uses oblivious transfer to
transfer the message between a user and the server to prevent the key server from
obtaining information about data, and provides users with encrypted messages
without knowing any information about the secret key of the server. As long as
the server is not accessible by an attacker, the system will be secure. However, this
method suffers from single point of failure, and since DupLESS needs one server to
generate the same key, it suffers from scalability problem, showing that it is not
suitable for large networks such as P2P and NDN.
Liu et al. introduced a method for providing de-duplication in cloud storage and
remove the additional server by using client-side encryption and PAKE (Password
Authentication Key Exchange) [90]. In this method, the users first send a short
hash of the file to server and the server determines if any other users sent the same
file. If any other users send the same file, the server lets them run a single round
PAKE protocol. If the users have the same file, the uploader will receive the same
key as the previous user, otherwise, it will receive a random key. This method is not
suitable for NDN because the encryption is based on the users’ secret keys and not
on data; while in NDN the content (data) is distributed in the network. Moreover,
in NDN, the providers are the first entities that inject data to networks so the key
would need to be exchanged between the user and the provider which would be
similar to exchanging a secret key between them. Therefore, this method does not
provide an efficient way for generating random string names in NDN.
Duan and Yitao used group signature as encryption to improve the DupLESS
method [55]. In this method, the users encrypt data using t+1 servers. Therefore, in
this method the signature is distributed among several servers which is more suitable
for P2P networks as well as for NDN. Moreover, the system is secure against up
to t corrupted users and servers. However, in this method there is a need of the
trusted entity to distribute group signature among servers which can be considered
honest but curious. However, the equality of messages may reveal some information
to attackers in methods based on MLE.
Our proposed method for obfuscating names in NDN is based on the obfuscation
technique proposed by Duan and Yitao [55]. However, we introduce an additional
level of privacy protection using gateways.
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4.2 Problem statement and potential attacks
In this chapter, we focus on privacy of users and try to mitigate name-monitoring
attacks that can endanger users' privacy. In NDN architecture, the hierarchical
naming technique and un-encrypted names are used to reap benefits of easier routing
and in-network caching, respectively. However, hierarchical and un-encrypted names
can reveal information of content that can endanger users' privacy.
NDN names are potentially meaningful to humans. The more granular and well
defined the structure, the more specific they are. Secondly, while content names
are “metadata” in the normal communications sense (just like IP addresses or
telephone numbers are metadata), it is widely accepted that metadata associated
with communications sessions is as valuable, sensitive, and private as content/data.
In the case of addresses, the threat is of traffic analysis (who talks to whom); in the
case of name-spaces, it is who is interested in what.
The attacks relevant to the threat in consideration can be internal or external. The
active or passive attacks performed by the compromised internal nodes by tracking
its neighbors, flooding the wrong false message on routing and so on are called insider
attacks [64]. Such attacks are also known as Byzantine attacks. In Byzantine attacks,
a set of intermediate nodes working individually within the network carry out attacks
like forming routing loops, consuming time and bandwidth by forwarding packet
from non-optimal paths, and selectively dropping packets to disrupt the network.
Following are some of the most well known node-oriented byzantine attacks:
(a) Selfish node attack
(b) Black hole attack
(c) Worm hole attack
(d) Grey hole attack
4.2.1 Selfish node attack
During the route discovery process, the source node sends route discovery packets to
the intermediate nodes to find new path to destination. In a Selfish node attack,
a faulty node corrupts the route discovery packets to advertise itself as having the
shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to compromise. The attacker aims
at modifying the information so that they can control the traffic flow of the network.
Malicious nodes quickly respond to the source node as these nodes do not refer to
the routing table and drop all the routing packets and also flood false information of
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the shortest route in network. The source node assumes that the route discovery
process is complete and ignores other route reply messages from other nodes and
selects the path through the malicious node to route the data packets.
4.2.2 Black hole attack
In this attack, when a vicious node senses some route request packet in the network,
it responds to the legitimate node by pretending it has the shortest and original
route to the destination node even if no such route exists. Subsequently, the vicious
node easily drops the packet and/or introduces misleading routing information in
the network.
4.2.3 Grey hole attack
Grey hole attack is a denial of service attack in which routers in a mesh topology
forward a subset of packets which are handled by the targeted receiver but left by
others.
4.2.4 Worm hole attack
Worm hole connects two different points in space through shortcut path. In this
attack, a pair of attacking nodes can intercept the route by short circuiting the
network. Worm hole attack can be performed with single node too but is generally
carried out by worm hole link.
4.3 Determining privacy-sensitivity
Privacy-sensitivity is obviously a contextual phenomenon [86], including but not
limited to the time and geographical location of the interest. What may be termed as
an intellectual debate in one part of the world may be considered an execution-able
offense in another. What may be termed as personal liberation in one community,
could be termed as an unspeakable act of shame in another. Personal data, e.g., health
data could have severe economic or political implications on personnel, countries, and
organizations depending upon the content and location of the data being considered.
Problems may arise with such data when it is associated with a) countries where
this content is considered politically sensitive or b) sharing more information than
necessary by the “need to know” access control principles in information security [108].
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In monitoring attacks, an attacker can access the same router that a user can fetch
data from, and the attacker tries to identify users and recognizes users' requested
content. The attacker may know victims' habits such as language and region.
4.4 System description and threat models
The system consists of three entities namely: 1) consumer (user), 2) router, and 3)
content provider.
In this work, we attempt to mitigate name and monitoring attacks that can endanger
users’ privacy. In NDN architecture, 1) hierarchical and 2) un-encrypted names are
used to allow benefits of easier routing and in-network caching, respectively. However,
they can reveal private information regarding content that can invade users' privacy.
To protect users's privacy and to prevent an attacker from finding out users's interest,
we consider the following threat models:
• Attacker may be an eavesdropper who can probe the traffic transferred between
a user and a provider.
• Attacker may be any router or can compromise a set of routers.
• Attacker may be a user who can monitor the traffic, generate an interest message
and receive the corresponding data packet, or can compromise a set of users.
• Attacker may compromise a set of routers and users and/or facilitate collusion
among them.
• Attacker can correlate corresponding data for each interest that returns to
the users. Therefore, although the users may use different formats of interest
(different encryption for the same interest message), the attackers can perceive
that the two interests generated by two different users are the same if these
users receive the same corresponding data.
Moreover, we consider the frequency attack which is the well-known inference
attack used to break deterministic encryption [69] [99]. In our case, the adversary
can eavesdrop on the request (interest) and see the cached contents of each edge
router. Therefore, with accessing some auxiliary information about the popularity
distribution of contents, the adversary can perform the frequency attack on the
encrypted interests.
Let No be the set of obfuscated name (ciphertext) o observed by an attacker, and
Np be the set of name (plaintext) N in a local area at a specific time. Given a
deterministic obfuscated name o over No, and auxiliary information about popularity
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distribution of local content (name) N over Np, the attack performs by assigning the
ith most frequent o to the ith most popular N . Then, the attacker can understand
the user's interest by mapping obfuscated interest o to real name N . Let Hist() is a
function to return the number of times each item in a given set is requested, and
sort() is a function to sort the result of Hist() in descending order. Let for all items
in the set, ρ be the sort of Hist(No), and π be the sort of Hist(Np). Moreover, we
denote the rank of o which is the position of the occurrence of o in sorted set ρ by
Rankρ(o). Formally, the attack performs as follows:
• ρ←− sort(Hist(No))
• π ←− sort(Hist(Np))
• calculate α : No −→ Np such that
α(o) =
π[Rankρ(o)] if o ∈ No⊥ if o /∈ No,
where α defines the guessed mapping between encrypted names and plain-text
names. Moreover, the accuracy of the attack is estimated based on the total
number of attacker's correct guesses.
4.5 Assumptions
Following are the assumptions used in this evaluation:
• Since we are focusing on name privacy, we assume that the content is encrypted
by the provider. The encryption key may be generated and shared by various
methods. One of these methods is to generate the key from the obfuscated
name.
• It is noteworthy that we are not including cryptography or code vulnerabilities
as threats in the scope of this thesis.
• We assume that if there are different ways to obfuscate a name, the producer
shall provide for the corresponding/salient encryption technique for the linked
data accordingly.
• We assume that the content is encrypted by the provider in order to preserve
name privacy using MLE. The encryption key is derived from the service name
in an obfuscated way with the help of key servers as in a server-aided MLE
scheme [55]. Therefore, if the users are allowed to obfuscate content names
partially or fully, there will be different keys for each type of obfuscation. So
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the producer would need to provide different encryptions of corresponding data
respectively.
• We assume that there is a fully trusted dealer who generates secret shared keys
used to obfuscate names in the first layer of privacy protection. The dealer
distributes the keys to the key servers securely.
• We assume that the gateways used in the second layer of privacy protection are
honest but curious.
• Since two different layers of privacy protection utilize two independent mecha-
nisms (key servers and gateways), we assume that the adversary’s capacity to
collude with or compromise both the key servers and gateways is not beyond
a reasonable limit. In other words, we are assuming that both the privacy
protection layers cannot be fully compromised simultaneously.
4.6 Preliminaries and Definitions
4.6.1 Encryption techniques
Oblivious Pseudo Random Function(OPRF)
A verifiable oblivious PRF scheme [98] consists of five algorithms OPRF = (Kg, EvC,
EvS, Vf, Ev), the last two being deterministic. Verifiable OPRF schemes can be built
from deterministic blind signatures [38]. Therefore, we use RSA-OPRF[G,H] scheme
based on the RSA blind signature [31] [41]. The RSA blind signature scheme includes
fixed public RSA exponent e. The key generation takes e as an input to generate
M, d such that ed ≡ 1 mod Φ(n), where n < e and modulus M is the product of
two distinct prime numbers with approximately equal lengths. The output of this
scheme is (n, (n, d)) as the public key and private key respectively. At the client
side, the user uses hash of the name as H : {0, 1}∗ → Zn, and then multiplies the
hash with the blinding element re where re is a random group element and sends the
resulting blinded hash x to the Key Server. The Key Server encrypts x with secret
key d to generate y and sends back to the consumer. The consumer removes the
blinding from y to generate z. For verification, the consumer computes (zemodn)
and checks if it equals H(N). Finally, if the verification is confirmed, the consumer
will generate final output G(z) where G is another collision-resistance hash function.
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Threshold Signature
In the threshold scheme [55] used for name obfuscation, parameter l depicting the
number of players (key servers) and parameter t<l define a (t+1,l) threshold signature
where a subset of t+1 players can generate a signature, but a subset of t or less
players cannot generate a valid signature. To provide convergent, non-interactive,
and efficient properties, the threshold scheme used by Duan and Yitao [55] is based
on Shoup's RSA-based scheme [110].
In the RSA threshold signature scheme, the trusted entity which we call dealer,
















. The dealer selects the RSA public exponent e where e > 1 and prime.
The public key is PK = (n,e)
In the dealing phase, the dealer generates a public key PK, secret key shares
SK1, ..., SKl, and verification keys V K, V K1, ...V Kl. let Z be the set of integers,
and for positive integer n, let Zn = {0, 1, .., n − 1} and Z∗n = {i ∈ Z : 1 ≤ i ≤
n − 1}. The dealer determines d ∈ Z such that de ≡ 1 mod m. The dealer sets




i ∈ Z[X] is defined by numbers a0, ...., at. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the dealer
computes di = f(i) mod m, where di is the secret key share SKi of player i. Let
Qn (which is in cyclic of order m) be the subgroup of squares in Z∗n. The dealer
randomly selects v ∈ Qn and for 1 ≤ i ≤ l calculates vi = vSi ∈ Qn. These elements
define the verification keys: V K = v and V Ki = vi.
Let ∆ = l!. For any subset S of t+ 1 points in {1, ..., l} and for any i ∈ {1, ..., l}\S








For the NDN name N , let x = H(N), where H is a hash function defined as
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zn. The signature share of key server i consists of (xi = x2∆si ∈ Qn)
along with a proof of correctness that is the log of x2i to the base of
∼
x= x4∆ which is
the same as the log of vi to the base v.
To combine the valid shares from a set S = {i1, ..., it+1} ⊂ {1, ...., l} of players, we
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) = 1, we can compute y such that ye = x. Moreover, according to a standard
algorithm y = waxb where a and b are integers and e
′
a+ eb = 1 that can be attained
from the extended Euclidean algorithm on e
′
and e.
4.6.2 Game theory model
In this section, we explain the use of the game theory model based on Shokri and
Reza’s method [109] to select the optimum name privacy protection level to meet the
user's need. We assume that a user shares the name of the requested data with the
network to receive the corresponding data. However, the user wants to protect her
sensitive information from untrustworthy entities. According to her desired privacy
level, the user must make a trade-off between efficiency and privacy. Following are
some noteworthy considerations to guide the user’s decision.
(a) Name obfuscation involves overheads caused by:
i. Crypto-computation
ii. Key distribution
(b) The gateway system has potential latency overhead and may also cause some
reduction in bandwidth.
(c) Together, the combination of the two privacy protection approaches might reduce
the effectiveness of NDN caching algorithms. Hence, there is a compromise in
efficiency.
In short, the stronger the privacy, the more the network delay and the higher the cost
(resulting from procedures such as name obfuscation and routing through gateways).
The flow of sharing name data is shown in Fig. 4.3.
Protection mechanism
We assume that a user wants to protect her privacy by keeping the content name
N ∈ Ns as confidential as possible, where Ns is a set of all possible names. Ac-
cording to her required privacy protection level, the user chooses different ways of
encryption including various levels of name obfuscation and gateway routing. In
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name obfuscation, a part or whole of the name may be encrypted. Thereon, it may
be routed through different number of gateways. We assume that this encrypted
information (name) o ∈ O is observable through the network. We consider that the
observable name is sampled according to distribution (4.3).
p(o|N) = Pr(O = o|Ns = N) (4.3)
Generally, the members of observable O can be a subset of the different ways that a
name can be encrypted.
Utility cost function
Our work is based on the premise that the user is willing to accept the cost of her
desired level of privacy. For NDN name privacy, this is the cost of name obfusca-
tion and the cost of introducing gateways, both processes involving computational
overhead as well as causing delay.
Let us assume that the difference between the cost of retrieving an obfuscated/encrypted
name versus an non-obfuscated or un-encrypted name (plain text), added to the
difference between the cost of retrieving an obfuscated or non-obfuscated name from
a (number of) gateway(s) versus without any gateway, equals the Utility Cost c(o,N).
Although the exact delay cost (diffidence delay) cannot be calculated since data can
be retrieved from any cache of intermediate routers in the network, we can definitely
estimate the delay cost by considering the cost difference in data retrieval for an
encrypted name and an un-encrypted name, with or without gateways. This is due
to the fact that more encryption can impose limitation on routing and retrieving
data from nearby a user. Therefore, the Utility Cost c(o,N) is a summation of the
costs of applying obfuscation and using number of gateways. We use a Hamming
distortion function for the obfuscation cost (i.e., the obfuscation cost is 0 if no
obfuscation is carried out on the interest name, otherwise it is 1 for partial or
full name obfuscation). Moreover, the cost includes number of gateways as more
gateways can impose more delay to retrieve data from the nearby user. Therefore,
the expected utility cost can be computed as (4.4).∑
o
p(o|N).c(o,N) (4.4)
The utility cost function can be based on applications or users' preferences.
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Inference Attack
We assume that adversary wants to get users' sensitive information by observing a
name sent to the network. Therefore, the attacker tries to estimate the real name
N̂ ∈ Ns from the observed name o ∈ O. The probability distribution for estimating
a real name from an observed name can be shown as (4.5).
q(N̂ |o) = Pr(Ns = N̂ |O = o) (4.5)
In other words, inference algorithm q tries to invert the effect of privacy protection
p. Moreover, the error of the inference algorithm to estimate the real name of the
message can be estimated by the distortion privacy metric.
Distortion Privacy Metric
To calculate the privacy distortion metric, d(N̂ ,N) is considered as the difference
between the name N̂ (estimated by the attacker) and real name N . The distortion
privacy metric is determined by the user depending on her sensitivity about the
real name N being revealed to an attacker (when the attacker estimates the name
N̂ based on the information available to him). Therefore, the higher the value
of d(N̂ ,N) the lesser the user’s concern about the observed name o. The user’s





q(N̂ |o).d(N̂ ,N) (4.6)
It is noteworthy that just as a specific interest message containing name and the
corresponding data message would hold a certain level of privacy sensitivity to the
user, they would also hold a value for the adversary. In this work, the specific value
of a certain piece of information/interest/content to the adversary is termed as
advantage. The adversary also incurs a cost of resources to carry out an attack which
is denoted by ca. Hence, an attack would only be feasible to an adversary if:
advantage > ca (4.7)
This implies that the attack has a threshold point and once the adversary reaches
the limit where ca is approaching a value equal to the advantage, the attack would
need to be stopped whether successful or not. In other words, by that point the
attacker/adversary would have exhausted the allocated resources for the particular













Figure 4.1: The flowchart of the proposed method for selecting the proper mechanism
based on the privacy level given by a user.
i.e., if the cost for an attacker is more than the value of the stolen information, then
d(N̂ ,N) has a higher value and it is harder for an attacker to estimate the real name
from an encrypted/obfuscated name.
4.7 The proposed approach
In this section we describe the outline of the proposed method and details of the
two privacy layers.
As described (with examples) earlier in Chapter 1 Section 1.4, NDN content names
are hierarchical and include different levels. In this work, two different privacy
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protection processes are proposed. The first process is the name obfuscation to
ensure name privacy. The Convergent Encryption (CE) method [55] used in this
work implies that any two names that are identical should still appear identical in
the network after encryption. This poses a privacy leakage risk. To mitigate this
risk, we used an additional layer of security which separates the interest for named
data from the user requesting it. A user’s interest is hidden from the neighboring
routers/network by using gateways in between. The proposed method is further
explained below:
(a) As shown in Fig. 4.1, based on the user's privacy requirements, firstly she
chooses whether to use name obfuscation or not and then the required extent
of name obfuscation (full or partial).
(b) Secondly, she chooses whether or not to use gateways and the required number
of gateways.
(c) If the user decides to obfuscate the name, she uses the following process: Each
user has her own key and uses it to send the encrypted name to t+ 1 servers
with oblivious transfer as shown in Algorithm 3. In the algorithms and rest
of this chapter when we use k indexed to any variable, it depicts the level
of sections in a hierarchical name, e.g., if N is a name cnn/eng/news, Nk is
cnn/eng/news when k = 3 , Nk is cnn/eng when k = 2, and Nk is cnn when
k = 1.
(d) Each server signs the message (encrypted name) transferred by the user. In
other words, the server uses signature as encryption for the encrypted name.
Since users use oblivious transfer to send the message to each server, the servers
cannot gain any information about the message and users cannot get any
information about servers' secret keys, as illustrated in Algorithm 4.
(e) After receiving the signed interest messages, the user removes the blinding r
from the encrypted name. The encryption of this interest message is based on
convergent encryption and includes the interest message and group signature
(the secret keys of t+ 1 servers). This process is depicted in Algorithm 5.
(f) For the second layer of privacy, based on the required privacy level the user
decides the number of gateways and encrypts the message with (suitable number
of) secret shared keys to transfer it to the proper gateway. Onion encryption is
used for encrypting the message between the user and gateways.
(g) When the message reaches the final gateway, this gateway can decrypt the CE
based encrypted message. Therefore, it can send this message to the network.
(h) The data message corresponding to the interest message can be fetched from
the cached router if the corresponding data message is saved in an intervening
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router, otherwise the data message can be fetched from the original server
(content provider).
Algorithm 3 Consumer to Key server
Input: Key registration n, RSA public exponent e, and real name N
Output: Hierarchical blinded name x
if e ≤ n then return false
r
$←− Zn
for k = 1→ |N | do
h = H1(N1‖N2..‖Nk)
x = Append (x, h · re) = (x||h · re)
return x
Algorithm 4 Key server i to Consumer
Input : Name x and secret server key di
Output : Hierarchical encrypted and blinded name yi
1: for k = 1→ |x| do




Algorithm 5 Consumer to Gateway/Network
Input : Hierarchical encrypted and blinded name yi and Key registration n
Output : Hierarchical encrypted name G
for i = 1→ t+ 1 do
if proof of Key server i for yi fail then return false
combine t+1 signature yi → y
for k = 1→ |N | do
z = Append (z, yk.r
−1 mod n)
if ze mod n 6= hk then return false
G = Append (G,G(z))
return G
4.7.1 First privacy layer: name obfuscation
As it was mentioned before, the default name used in NDN reveals a lot of information
that can show consumers' interests. Therefore, in the first privacy layer of the
proposed method, we obfuscate the name to transfer meaningful names to random
string names. To retain the NDN in-networking caching feature, name obfuscation
is based on Credential Encryption (CE) implying that two identical names are
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obfuscated to the identical random strings. Moreover, the proposed method keeps
the hierarchical structure of the names that is useful for efficient routing. As shown
in Algorithm 3, the consumer selects a random number as blinding r. Next, the
consumer sends the product of r with the hash of the name h to t+ 1 key servers.
Therefore, as depicted in Algorithm 4, the consumer uses oblivious transfer to send
the name x to key servers, and the key server signs (encrypts) the blinded name
x with its secret key di without any knowledge of N . In this case, the encrypted
name yi is generated from the server key di and the blinded name x, and key server
i returns hierarchical encrypted name yi including blinding r to the consumer. By
using shared signatures and oblivious transfer, the proposed method mitigates the
effect of the dictionary attacks. Oblivious transfer ensures that the consumers do not
access secret keys and the key servers encrypt (sign) the names without knowing the
users' requested name (interest). Moreover, by using shared signatures, encryption
is distributed among t+ 1 servers, thus reducing the possibility of a single point of
failure.
After the consumer receives the encrypted name yi, first she checks the proof of
correctness by calculating (4.1) and (4.2) and comparing it with the log of the server
verification key vi to base of v shown in Algorithm 5. After receiving the encrypted
name from the t+ 1 key servers, the consumer verifies and combines the signatures
using (4.2). After computing (4.2) the consumer can calculate y, remove the blinding
r to get z. Moreover, the consumer verifies that ze is same as the hash of the name
h. If this verification is confirmed, the consumer returns the hash of encrypted name
G which is the obfuscated name.
4.7.2 Second privacy layer: gateways
The first privacy protection layer of our proposed method implies that two identical
names would yield identical obfuscated names. This could cause a privacy vulnera-
bility susceptible to inference, which is addressed by introducing the second privacy
protection layer. The second privacy protection layer uses gateways, i.e., routers
capable of encrypting as well as routing interest messages. The user can send the
name to a gateway that can uniquely encrypt the message and also hide the link
between the user and the requested message. According to the consumers' privacy
level and sensitivity of data, the consumers may choose to uniquely encrypt the
message to one or more gateways. Therefore, according to the privacy level, the
consumers decide how far the uniquely encrypted message should be sent, i.e., how
many gateways it should be routed through. We used the Onion routing method [115]
for this purpose. The process is described below:
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(a) The user first selects the number of gateways she wants to use based on the
desired level of privacy protection.
(b) The user exchanges the session key (symmetric key) with the gateway using
the gateway's public key (asymmetric key).
(c) The interest message is then encrypted with layers of different session keys
corresponding to the gateways.
(d) Each gateway decrypts its layer and forwards the message to the next gateway.
(e) The last gateway removes the last layer of the encryption and then forwards
the interest message according to the default NDN rules to fetch date from the
cache or forward the interest further.
(f) According to NDN routing rules, the content message follows the interest’s
reverse path.
(g) When the content message is returned from the network to the last gateway
(which is also the first gateway on the reverse path), it is again encrypted with
the shared key of the gateway.
(h) From one gateway to the next, the data message is encrypted in layers.
(i) Once the user receives the data message, she decrypts it.
4.7.3 Privacy level determination using game theory
Privacy preservation mandates that minimum information should be revealed to any
adversary. For NDN, this would include the content’s name and how much it reveals
about the content as well. Additionally, the correlation between the interest/content
and the user could be exploited by an adversary. However, there is a trade-off
between providing name privacy and using benefits of NDN. Therefore, name privacy
preservation should provide the optimal level of privacy that does not spoil NDN
features such as decreasing delay and pervasive caching (content distribution).
We define a method based on Game theory [73], wherein a user can determine the
level of privacy which fulfills her requirements. We can set the level of privacy based
on first and second layers of privacy as discussed in the previous subsection, to achieve
the user's requirements for providing optimum privacy and efficiency in receiving
data. Fig. 4.2 shows the problem of choosing a trade-off between user privacy and
utility in NDN with the game model in the extensive form (i.e, as a tree diagram),
and the normal form (i.e, in tabular form) of this problem statement is shown in
Table 4.1. As shown in Fig. 4.2, we assume that a user according to sensitivity of









(Vnmed + Vpmed , 0)
(Vpmax , 0)
(Vnmed , Wamed)
Figure 4.2: The tree diagram of the named privacy game model (Vp and Vn are the user’s
privacy and network utility payoffs respectively. Wa is the adversary’s payoff)
or weakest level of privacy. It is noteworthy that the privacy levels can vary to more
than one value/level in between the maximum and minimum privacy levels. However
in this thesis, for the ease of discussion, we have only shown three privacy levels.
We depict the privacy level as Po,g where o represents level of name obfuscation as
described in the first layer of privacy and g represents number of gateways utilized
as described in the second layer of privacy. When a user chooses maximum privacy
level i.e., Pmax, then Pmax = (Pomax , Pgmax). A medium level privacy level can be
depicted by Pmed which may equal (Pomax , Pgmin), or (Pomin , Pgmax), or (Pomed , Pgmed).
A minimum or weakest privacy level can be depicted as Pmin = (Pomin , Pgmin). Both
name obfuscation and gateway utilization include encryption, decryption, and routing
costs. This cost also known as utility cost defined in (4.4) also includes the delay
factor. Since utility cost is directly proportional to the privacy levels chosen, it
implies that when privacy is maximum, (Pmax), so is utility cost (Cmax). Vp is the
privacy payoff for the user which is ∝ d (defined in (4.6)) and Vn is the network
utility payoff for the user which is ∝ utility cost. Wa is the payoff for the adversary
which is ∝ 1/d. We have previously defined that for the advantage and cost ca in
(4.7) for the adversary and how that impacts d. The game theory payoffs for the
user and the adversary are illustrated in Fig. 4.2.
The normal form is also shown in Table 4.1. In this table, the first column corresponds
to the potential strategy of the adversary, and the first row corresponds to the
potential strategy of the normal user.
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Table 4.1: The Normal form of the named privacy game model(Vp and Vn are the user’s privacy




If the user opts for Pmin,
the adversary will detect
;if the user opts for Pmed,
the adversary may detect;
if the user opts for Pmax,
an adversary cannot detect
(Wamax, Vnmax) (Wamed, Vnmed) (0, Vpmax)
If the user opts for Pmin,
the adversary will detect ;if
the user opts for Pmed, the
adversary may not detect;
if the user opts for Pmax,
an adversary cannot detect
(Wamax, Vnmax) (0, Vnmed+ Vpmed) (0, Vpmax)
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Figure 4.3: The process of sharing a name from a user to an attacker
Game theory problem statement
In this work, we try to balance between user's utility function and privacy. Therefore,
the proposed method tries to find an optimal utility function that keeps the user's
privacy at a certain level. Generally, the proposed method maximizes the utility
function with guaranteed distortion privacy.
Therefore, the problem is to find optimum value p∗ for the probability distribution







This optimization should be provided within the user's privacy constraints. We denote
the minimum desired distortion privacy level as dm. If the protection mechanism
p∗ satisfies the inequality defined in (4.9) below, then the user's average distortion





q∗(N̂ |o).d(N̂ ,N) ≥ dm (4.9)
Game theory solution
In the proposed method, the user starts the game by choosing a privacy level as
described in Section 4.7.3. Following that, the adversary applies a suitable inference
attack. We assume that the privacy protection mechanism is not a secret to the
adversary, so she can adapt her attack accordingly.
The best privacy protection mechanism is the one that can anticipate and overcome
an adaptive adversarial behavior. The user must anticipate the optimal inference
attack by the adversary and optimize her objective (utility and privacy) accordingly.
Therefore, we do not model any specific adversary. However, we consider the
adversary that minimizes d(N̂ ,N) as described in Section 4.6.2 to successfully
compromise users' privacy.
It is noteworthy to explain here that the privacy distortion metric, d(N̂ ,N) is
considered as a difference between the name N̂ (estimated by the attacker) and
real name N . The distortion privacy metric is determined by the user based on
sensitivity of the user about revealing the real name N when an attacker estimates
N̂ . Since estimating the real name for an attacker with using obfuscation and more
gateways becomes hard, the distortion privacy metric can be defined as shown in
(4.10). Where LO is the length of obfuscation (number of obfuscated levels of the
name), LN is the length of the real name (number of levels the name has), D(E,G)
is the distance between edge router and the gateway, and D(E,P ) is the distance
between the edge router and the producer (maximum distance). Therefore, the value
of d(N̂ ,N) is between zero and two. While d(N̂ ,N) value is zero when there is no
protection method, d(N̂ ,N) becomes two when there is maximum protection i.e.








As it is impossible to list all user-adversary models, to model the proposed method,
we use a Stackelberg (leader-follower) game in which the user selects an optimal
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protection mechanism p∗ and the adversary follows the user by selecting an optimal
inference attack q∗. Thus, solutions p∗ and q∗ are mutually optimal against each
other and p∗ is optimal against any inference attack.
For any name N ∈ Ns, the user strategy space model is all observable O, and
for any observable o ∈ O an attacker space model is Ns which is set of all pos-
sible estimated names N̂ ∈ Ns. Therefore, the mixed strategy for a user can be
shown by a vector p(.|N) = (p(o1|N), p(o2|N), ...p(om|N)), where {o1, o2, ..., om} = O
and the mixed strategy for an adversary can be shown by a vector q(.|o) =
(q(N̂1|o), q(N̂2|o), ...q(N̂j|o)), where {N̂1, N̂2..., N̂j} = Ns. The vectors p(.|N) and
q(.|o) are conditional distribution functions with an obfuscated function for name
N and an inference algorithm for an observable name o respectively. As shown in
(4.11) and (4.12), P and Q are all sets of all mixed strategies for user and adversary
respectively.
P = {p(.|N) = (p(o1|N), p(o2|N), ...p(om|N)),∀N ∈ Ns :





Q = {q(.|o) = (q(N̂1|o), q(N̂2|o), ...q(N̂j|o)),∀o ∈ O :
q(N̂j|o) ≥ 0,∀N̂j ∈ Ns,
∑
j
q(N̂j|o) = 1} (4.12)
The pure strategy of choosing action k is the member vector of the set P and Q
where the kth element of these sets is 1 and other elements are zero.
To consider distortion privacy, the game should be formulated as Baysian Stack-
elberg [103]. In this game, the optimal values p∗ ∈ P and q∗ ∈ Q to create the
equilibrium point will be defined. After that if a user deviates from this value and
selects p′, there will be an inference attack q′∗ against users that decreases the user's
privacy than the optimal value p∗. Next we discuss how to obtain the optimal values
for this game.
To solve the aforementioned Bayesian Stackelberg game [103] and find the equilibrium
point (p∗, q∗), first we assume that an adversary finds the optimal inference attack q∗
against any user's protection mechanism. Therefore, the user's protection mechanism
shall be defined according to her object function and privacy constraint (dm) as
mentioned in this section earlier. This solution will maximize the user's utility




The adversary tries to minimize the error of the inference algorithm. If function
d(N̂ ,N) determines the error in estimating real name N by the adversary, she will
try to minimize the error function d(N̂ ,N) to optimize the inference attack. However,
a user tries to maximize function d(N̂ ,N) to protect his privacy. The adversary's
expected error function can be computed as mentioned in (4.13).∑
N,o,N̂
p(o|N).q(N̂ |o).d(N̂ ,N) (4.13)
To optimize the inference attack, the adversary minimizes the expected error function





p(o|N).q(N̂ |o).d(N̂ ,N) (4.14)
Optimal utility function
To optimize the utility function, the user needs to minimize the utility cost of
name encryption. However, the optimal utility function should consider the privacy
constraint corresponding to the user’s chosen privacy level. Therefore, the problem









p(o|N).q∗(N̂ |o).d(N̂ ,N) ≥ dm
(4.15)
However, to solve (4.15), we need to know q∗, and to get q∗ from (4.14), we need to
know p∗. Therefore, the solution of one equation is required for another equation.
This problem reflects the concept of the best response of two players in game theory
model. To break this loop, we use the game theory model, and since the optimization
formula for an adversary and a user is different, we model this problem as a nonzero-
sum Stacklberg game. We can prove that the best strategy for the user can be
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In NDN, name is a common identifier used for both interest and content messages,
and the name can reveal substantial information that can endanger users' privacy.
We assume that the data (content) is encrypted with the provider's key or using the
obfuscated name as key so only legitimate users or the users who know the name
can decrypt it. As mentioned earlier, we assume that the adversary can access traffic
channel between users and providers (act as an eavesdropper).
We also consider an adversary who can access users, routers, and can compromise
multiple routers and users. However, we assume a reasonable level of privacy
protection using our two-layer privacy protection mechanism. In this section, we
discuss how each layer of privacy protection can combat different kinds of attacks
separately and then jointly.
4.8.1 Name obfuscation
In the first layer of privacy protection, the name is obfuscated either partially or
fully. The user may also have the option of not obfuscating the name at all.
lemma 1




The proposed name obfuscation method is inspired by MLE encryption. However,
this encryption technique can still be vulnerable to a brute force attack. The reason
behind this is that any one can generate the key from the name. To address this
vulnerability, we use multiple key servers to generate keys using the name and a
secret key. Moreover, the encryption process is via oblivious transfer, implying that
1) the key servers are not privy to any information about the name and 2) the user
is not privy to any information about the secret key. Therefore, the adversary would
need to compromise the key-generating servers; knowing the content name alone
would not serve the purpose.
corollary a
Utilizing MLE principles, the proposed name obfuscation method is secure for
unpredictable names.
lemma 2
The proposed method offers resistance to the compromise of upto t number of nodes.
t may be the total number of users, key servers, or both.
proof 2
As described earlier in Section 4.6, since we use shared signatures of t+ 1 servers, the
method is effective for up to t servers. This is because any subset of t+ 1 servers can
generate valid signatures but the subset of t or less key servers cannot. However, we
assume that the dealer generating public keys, shared keys, and verification keys is
the “trusted party”. If the dealer gets compromised, the security of the obfuscation
layer degrades to the general security level of MLE which is secure for unpredictable
names.
It must be noted that the first privacy layer, i.e., the name obfuscation privacy
protection does not offer secrecy against inference of similar names, as the obfuscated
versions of two identical names shall be identical.
lemma 3
The proposed method prevents an attacker to correlate different obfuscated versions
of the specific interest message (including interests with partially and/or fully
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obfuscated names) with the corresponding data message.
proof 3
In the proposed method, the provider can provision different obfuscation formats for
the interest name and the corresponding content. In other words, different obfuscated
versions of one specific interest message correspond to different encrypted versions
of the same content. Therefore, an adversary cannot link different interest versions
with the same data. However, if the provider uses only one obfuscated version of the
name for a specific content, e.g., if it is a fully obfuscated name, then the consumer
must also use the fully obfuscated name to express their interest for that content.
4.8.2 Gateway routing
In the second layer of privacy, gateways are used between the user and the edge
router to prevent the linkage between the interest (specifying the content name) and
the user.
lemma 4
An adversary can link a name with a user if they are able to compromise the name
obfuscation, and are either able to eavesdrop on the interest in transit or compromise
the edge router. The second layer of privacy protection can prevent such inferences.
proof 4
The number of gateways is directly proportional to an adversary’s error of estimation
of the above mentioned “link” between a user and her interest.
The last gateway may be able to see the name, but is unable to link it with the user
who requested it, as the gateway routing is based on onion routing.
lemma 5
The second layer of privacy protection can mitigate frequency attacks where an
attacker can understand the user's interest by eavesdropping on the user's encrypted
request and accessing the cache of routers.
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proof 5
We assume that attackers know the popularity distribution of the content in the
local area and can access the cache of the edge router to map encrypted data to the
corresponding plaintext. The attacker can estimate ρ by sorting encrypted contents
based on their popularity distribution which is the total number of requests for a
given content. Also, with auxiliary information about the popularity of contents in
the local area, the attacker can compute π and calculate α to map the encrypted
content to the corresponding plaintext form. However, the proposed method can
create mismatching between π and α. This is due to the fact that users can hide a
request for the specific content from the local cache by applying the second layer of
protection. Therefore, the attackers see the different request distribution of contents
from the real one that makes unlinkability between π and α.
In order to demonstrate Lemma 5 in practice, we measure unlinkability with different
number of users who adopt additional privacy protection mechanism in Fig. 4.4. In
the simulation, we assumed that the local cache includes 100 encrypted contents,
and these contents are sorted based on the maximum request that they have received
which is randomly distributed between one and the maximum request rate. As
shown in Fig. 4.4, in our proposed method, once the concerned users decide to use
a privacy level, they can mitigate the frequency attack significantly by disordering
the frequency distribution of encrypted cached content. We change the maximum
number of users adopting privacy-preserving mechanism from 20% to 60%, and show
the proposed method can create unlinkability and mismatching between encrypted
data and plaintext data from 80% to 93% respectively. It is noticeable that even
with only maximum 20% of the total number of users, the proposed method can
gain 80% unlinkability between ρ and π that an inference attacker can compute.
Furthermore, as illustrated in Fig. 4.4, the percent of unlinkability increases as the
maximum number of requests decreases. This is due to the fact that when the
differences between the number of requests of the cached contents are reduced by
only a few numbers of users who are more concerned about privacy and apply the
second privacy layer, the probability of mismatching between ρ and π will rise.
corollary b
If the final gateway also happens to be the producer of the requested content, then
the proposed method can provide strong privacy, as the final gateway (producer)
would be the only one to see the name.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of unlinkability between ρ and π with changing maximum privacy
concerned users.
Table 4.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Scenario I Scenario II
Network access layer protocol Point to Point Point to Point
Traffic type CBR, Zipf CBR, Zipf
Zipf:α 0.9 0.9
Zipf: total number of content 100 100
Request rate (Interest packets/second) 100 100
Number of consumers 4 10
Number of providers 1 1
Data size (byte) 1024 1024
Simulation time (sec) 20 20
4.9 Evaluation
This section covers the network simulations performed using the ndnSIM pack-
age [93] which implements the basic component of NDN in a modular way. We used
the RocketFuel topology which is a well known topology widely used in previous
works [112][77]. As shown in Fig. 4.5, the topology includes 169 leaf nodes (red
circle), 45 routers (green circle), and 65 backbone nodes (blue circle). We selected a
backbone node as a producer and leaf nodes as consumers. We used Cisco 4000 family
Integrated Service Routers (ISRs) which run multiple concurrent services including
encryption and traffic management in addition to the traditional routing services
such as computing, forwarding, and caching. The ISR 4461 model includes 10 Gbps
performance and 7 Gbps encrypted throughput. Therefore, the AES encryption
and decryption delay for onion based routing are negligible against network packet
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Figure 4.6: Average end-to-end delay for a consumer with changing privacy levels
forwarding delay. Moreover, we consider the fact that in onion routing, the delay
caused by threshold signature computation and sharing keys with gateways are
dependent on consumer system’s capabilities and is independent of the routing delay
caused by message forwarding. Hence, we only evaluate the routing delay, i.e., the
delay caused by forwarding of messages in the network, ignoring the cryptographical
computation time.
The simulation parameters are listed in Table 4.2. The consumer's traffic follows
two distributions namely Constant Bit Rate (CBR) and Zipf. While in the CBR
distribution, a consumer requests data and sends interest message with constant
rate, in Zipf distribution, the consumer sends request with rate that follows Zipf's
























Figure 4.7: Average end-to-end delay for seven nodes with the maximum and minimum
privacy levels using gateways
assumed that every router in the network can act as a gateway. In other words, each
intermediate router in the Rocketfuel topology can act as:
(a) a normal router using its cache to fetch data for encrypted messages (which
does not use unique encryption)
or
(b) a gateway which cannot use its cache for encrypted messages and merely
forwards an encrypted requested message to the next hop.
The following two scenarios were used for evaluation:
Scenario I : In this scenario, we considered one producer and four consumers that
sent similar requests with two distributions: CBR and Zipf. The delay metric
(representing delay between sending first interest message and receiving corresponding
data message) is evaluated for a consumer by changing her security level. As shown
in Fig. 4.6, the delay is directly proportional to the security level. Since the distance
between the consumer and the producer was seven hops in this experiment, the
maximum security level could include six gateways. It is noteworthy that in the
absence of any privacy consideration, the consumer could get data from the producer
directly. However, for any security level less than the maximum of six hops, the data
can be fetched from intermediate routers to minimize the delay.
Scenario II : In this scenario, we considered one producer and ten consumers that
sent similar requests with two distributions: CBR and Zipf. In this scenario, we
evaluated delay for seven consumers with node ID from one to seven for minimum and
maximum security levels. While the minimum privacy level for all consumers implied
that number of gateways was constant i.e., zero, the maximum level varied with the



















Figure 4.8: Utility cost vs privacy for a consumer in Scenario I
maximum level of privacy was selected, data was fetched directly from the producer
(not intermediate caches). As illustrated in Fig. 4.7, the average delay in receiving
data packets for the maximum privacy level (for all consumers) is higher than that for
the minimum privacy level. It is assumed that in the scenarios under consideration,
data had been cached in intermediate routers to cater for the consumers who did not
use the gateways. However, when a consumer with the maximum level of privacy
requested a content for the very first time in the network, she had to experience
higher computational delays (compared to what she would with lower privacy levels).
This is due to the fact that in such a case, the consumer had no option but to fetch
data directly from the producer (irrespective of the minimum or maximum privacy
level selection). Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4.7, although both distributions depict
similar behaviour, for most consumers Zipf has a higher average delay compared
to CBR. This is because in the CBR distribution, evaluated consumers always
requested data which had been previously requested by other consumers. In the Zipf
distribution, the evaluated consumers requested data that was not requested and
hence not cached earlier.
4.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored name privacy in NDN through name obfuscation and gateway-
oriented onion routing. Privacy and utility are optimally chosen by the user (or application)
using the utility function.
User privacy is a critical aspect of NDN confidentiality and the users may have variable
needs of privacy based on the nature of content they intend to access. Based on this
premise we enable the user to choose from different levels of privacy related to two aspects,
i.e., the name itself and its correlation with the user. The hierarchy of the name is
maintained in the proposed mechanism. We used Rocketfuel topology in ndnSIM to
measure the privacy protection level and the consequential network delay. For future
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work, other simulation topologies as well as real life test beds of these simulations can
help us verify the effectiveness of our solution with the required trade-off between user’s
utility and privacy. Further work may also identify the impact of different users choosing
different levels of privacy (name obfuscation and gateways) upon the delay and hence
utility function, for the same name and content.
The next chapter bridges the gap between technology and business. We transition to




Design inputs for a future internet
architecture
In the previous chapters of this thesis, we presented specific technical problems related to
availability, integrity, and confidentiality (privacy) in CCN and their respective proposed
solutions. In this chapter, we transition from the technical evaluation to the translation of
some qualitative non-functional and functional requirements into quantitative parameters
so that their impact can be measured as precisely as possible to factor into the design of a
future internet architecture.
5.1 Functional and non-functional requirements
As previously mentioned in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, the constantly evolving diversity of
modern-day content and of the devices accessing it and the dynamically evolving needs of
scalability, accessibility, affordability, security, and privacy etc., have been indicating the
need for a future Internet architecture for quite some time.
It is also worthwhile to mention here that whether a requirement is functional or
non-functional is essentially a contextual fact. What may be a functional requirement for
one technical concept or product, might be non-functional for another, e.g., privacy, delay,
and availability, etc. In the software language some may argue [14] that “A functional
requirement describes what a software system should do, while non-functional requirements
place constraints on how the system will do so”. However, in an architectural design
phase, the how and what are interdependent. The design through all its stages, must be
informed by the functionality and vice versa. Moreover, internal factors such as delay and
external factors whether quantitative (such as cost of raw materials to build a 5G tower)
or qualitative (such as ease of usage generating value for the end user) are equally salient
and must be considered in any architectural design. These considerations are undoubtedly
logical for the design of a future internet architecture for reasons mentioned earlier in
93
Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.
Non-functional requirements cover a wide variety of issues and have been traditionally
mentioned in terms of software quality [42]. They are sometimes referred to as “ilities
or -ities”. Table 5.1 enlists some of the non-functional requirements salient to a future
internet architecture, including a few from previous works such as by Gomes et al. [71]




















Table 5.1: Some ilities
5.2 System Dynamics
To incorporate the quantitative and qualitative, functional, and non-functional parameters
and to measure their time-sensitive impact on any system simultaneously, business System
Dynamics (SD) [5] modelling is the most appropriate tool available: SD can be used to
understand the nonlinear behaviour of complex systems over time using stocks, flows,
internal feedback loops, table functions, and time delays.
System Dynamics is a methodology and mathematical modeling technique to frame,
understand, and discuss complex issues and problems. Originally developed in the 1950s
to help corporate managers improve their understanding of industrial processes, SD is
currently being used throughout the public and private sector for policy analysis and
design.
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Convenient graphical user interface (GUI) System Dynamics software developed into
user friendly versions by the 1990s and have been applied to diverse systems. SD models
solve the problem of simultaneity (mutual causation) by updating all variables in small
time increments with positive and negative feedbacks and time delays structuring the
interactions and control. The best known SD model is probably the 1972 The Limits to
Growth. This model forecast that exponential growth of population and capital, with finite
resource sources and sinks and perception delays, would lead to economic collapse during
the 21st century under a wide variety of growth scenarios.
System dynamics is an aspect of systems theory as a method to understand the dynamic
behavior of complex systems. The basis of the method is the recognition that the structure
of any system, the many circular, interlocking, sometimes time-delayed relationships among
its components, is often just as important in determining its behavior as the individual
components themselves. Examples are chaos theory and social dynamics. It is also claimed
that because there are often properties-of-the-whole which cannot be found among the
properties-of-the-elements, in some cases the behavior of the whole cannot be explained in
terms of the behavior of the parts.
5.3 An example of System Dynamics modelling
Earlier in this chapter Section 5.1 enlisted some of the non-functional requirements for
a prospective future internet architecture. The previous Section 5.2 described system
dynamics modelling. The following sections of this chapter present an example for the
evaluation of these non-functional requirements using system dynamics modelling. System
Dynamics [5] is a computer-aided approach to policy analysis and design. It applies to
dynamic problems arising in complex social, managerial, economic, and ecological sys-
tems—literally any dynamic systems characterized by interdependence, mutual interaction,
information feedback, and circular causality.
Coopetition: The new-age panacea for enabling ser-
vice provider sustainability and profitability
The marvels of fascinating technological advancements in the telecommunications indus-
try are shaping the human social fabric, politics, economics, and national and global
development. The telecommunications industry has been the most dynamic and volatile
during the last three decades. Evolution of mobile technology has revolutionized human
communication across the world. The access of Internet through mobile phones has raised
the usage and reach of Internet to a colossal scale.
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The wireless ecosystem is more complex than the wired Internet. All of the key
players in the ecosystem such as service providers or bit-pipe providers, end-user device
manufacturers, core equipment providers, content providers, and application developers,
as well as the end users are all interdependent. This diverse ecosystem encourages new
technological and business joint ventures; collaborative innovations to enable new service
offerings resulting in platform enrichment, and in turn delivering more value to the
consumers. This complexity presents new challenges, effects, and remunerations. It also
demands revision of business models, identification of collaborative innovation/coopetition
opportunities, and strategic evolution of the value chain players.
The SD analysis presented in this chapter is conceived and presented in layers. The
background layer is the analysis and study of the existing and evolving value chain of
the telecommunications industry which includes device manufacturers, content developers
and providers, fixed line and wireless communication providers. Three case studies were
evaluated to extract lessons about collaborative innovation and user experience control as
the front layers, later superimposed in the aggregated model to draw conclusions. It is
essential to note that the inferences from this work are takeaways for any player in the
value chain of the telecommunications industry. The rest of this chapter is organized as
follows:
Section 5.4 describes the research methodology. Three case studies are evaluated
in Sections 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7. Section 5.8 presents the aggregated model combining the
overlapping and unique parameters identified in the three cases studies. Section 5.9 sums
up the inferences derived from the work presented on these case studies. Section 5.10
describes the significance of socio-economic modelling for the design of a future internet
architecture. Section 5.11 describes an initiative aimed at providing affordable Internet
connectivity for the masses. Sections 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15 showcase causal loop
diagrams for the system dynamics modelling of the parameters salient to the new-age




Around two hundred and fifty formal and informal interviews were conducted with repre-
sentatives of various key players and stakeholders across the telecommunications value
chain from USA and Europe. The work focusing on the three case studies presented in this
builds on and extends the work submitted for my M.Sc. dissertation [78]. However, it is
imperative to clarify the substantial differences. Although the case studies are the same as
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in the M.Sc thesis, and some of the data (from 50 interviews) was re-used, extra data (from
200 interviews) was further collected and re-analysed. The interviewees included chief
operating officers, strategy heads, managers, research lab personnel, operational engineers
and application developers from service providers, wireless and wireline telecom operators,
content developers, infrastructure providers, and device manufacturers. As the majority of
the interviewees did not consent to publishing their names and company affiliations for
considerations of privacy and following professional ethics to respect the confidentiality of
their companies’ information, their names and affiliations are not explicitly mentioned in
the thesis. Moreover, although the same basic method (i.e., system dynamics modelling)
is applied, it is to a different problem and data, so produces different knowledge, specially
in correlation to the technical work presented in the rest of this thesis. While the MSc.
thesis [78] discussed the strategies for monetization of Quality of Service of data by cellu-
lar operators, the current thesis has a completely different context, i.e., to analyze the
availability, integrity, and confidentiality in CCN internet architectures.
We formulated the interview questions to gauge the direction and trends of the
telecommunications industry in general and the experimentation and innovation in the
mobile technology and services in particular. Some of the questions were designed to
determine the trends of the telecommunications value chain. For example, 80% of the
stakeholders agreed that voice was becoming a commodity. Research and development
teams of 90% of the service providers were working on value added services, which required
relaxation from the regulatory authorities.
Case Studies
Three case studies were used to analyse the common parameters listed in section in general
and the “User Experience Control” and “Collaborative Innovation” in particular. These
case studies are:
1. Zero.facebook.com, where Facebook collaborated with Mobile Network Opera-
tors (MNOs) around the world to bundle a stripped down Facebook application
version with a mobile connection.
2. Collaboration between Google Voice and Sprint where Sprint added OTT Google
Voice minutes to its mobile plans.
3. NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode, which served as a revolutionary concept in mobile services, as
a traditional mobile operator reshaped the consumer experience through customized
service offerings and by getting involved in almost all sectors of the telecommunication
value chain.
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Though individually unique and mutually disparate, the above listed three case studies
have been chosen as premises of this research work in an attempt to represent the diverse
issues salient to coopetition.
Modelling
We used SD modelling to evaluate the three case studies (mentioned in the previous
section) and then combined the salient variables together in the aggregated model. The
causal loop diagrams that have been simplified and trimmed to capture significant aspects
of the three individual cases studies are presented in upcoming sections of this chapter.
The aggregated model as presented in Section 5.8 was simulated to test the inferences and
endorse or dismiss the intuitions governed by the common parameters extracted from the
three case studies.
5.5 Zero.facebook.com
The zero.facebook.com initiative is Facebook’s attempt to replicate the initial viral effect
success story of Facebook.
The original reason for Facebook’s quick success at Harvard [124] was that it provided
the students a platform to interact and connect with new people at school, filling the void
of being away from their families. A Facebook user could easily acquire a substantial
amount of information about a potential friend (another Facebook user) through the
Internet. Soon after Facebook’s inception, it faced the decision of ending the exclusivity of
the social network by providing access to everyone; a decision that could make or break the
new enterprise due to issues of brand dilution, server space, and soaring costs associated
with the expansion. Existing advertising revenue was insufficient to cover the substantial
costs of expanding the network, so Facebook allowed access to anyone over thirteen years
of age who wanted to join the popular social network. Soon after, Facebook allowed anyone
to write programmes to run on it. There was no fee or permission required to write and
run these applications on Facebook. Thousands of applications thus developed kept pace
with the expanding network. This decision added an extra dimension to ways in which
a Facebook profile could be utilized [81], thus providing a vast and inexpensive gateway
to business users, who could now use the online social networking world to advertise and
expand their businesses.
Zero.facebook.com and Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)
In emerging Internet markets, Facebook collaborated with MNOs in a quest to associate a
new mobile internet user’s first encounter with mobile data connectivity exclusively with
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her first Facebook experience. The case study of zero.facebook.com is a clear example
of application-specific mobile Internet traffic discrimination, and a subtle example of
traffic prioritization. In this case, Facebook, an application provider, collaborated with
the existing and emerging mobile operators, to help them expand their subscriber base.
Primarily, this is an initiative taken by Facebook as an idea sold to mobile operators.
The idea stems out of Facebook’s intention to become the symbol of Internet for the new
social networking application users as they join the mobile Internet experience. Two of
the significant challenges associated with the mobile Internet usage are slow data transfers
and costly and complex data plans. These factors can deter the users from using the
mobile Internet frequently and seamlessly. Facebook designed zero.facebook.com to help
solve these two barriers with the hope that even more people will discover the mobile
Internet lured by Facebook’s brand appeal, recognition, and the need of association with
it. Zero.facebook.com is the stripped down version of the social networking application. It
is Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) based, hence lightweight and does not consume a
large amount of data bandwidth. The access to zero.facebook.com is free, i.e., it does not
get charged against the mobile Internet data traffic quota.
The incentive for Facebook is that the users bond with Facebook in a unique way, as
they associate the Internet experience through Facebook. The incentive for the mobile
operators is to get new subscriptions and introduce the mobile data services to these new
users or the existing customers. In exchange, the mobile operator charges the user for data
connectivity required to access and upload pictures, and non-Facebook Internet access
requirements.
The zero.facebook.com site was launched in 2010 in collaboration with 50 operators
that Facebook partnered with. People could still access Facebook from the standard
mobile site m.facebook.com or Facebook mobile site for touch screen mobile devices,
touch.facebook.com, under their operator’s standard data charges.
Causal loop diagram for zero.facebook.com
The causal loop diagram in Fig. 5.1 primarily depicts reinforcing loops, which show benefit
for both MNO and Facebook.
Basics of the SD causal loop diagrams
The arrows represent the causal relationship between two variables. The arrow points
from the cause towards the effect. The +ve sign shows that there is a positive correlation
or a reinforcing correlation between the two variables. For example, there is a +ve
arrow connecting the new mobile subscriptions to the MNO profitability. This positive
correlation implies that when the new mobile subscriptions increase, the MNO profitability
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Figure 5.1: Causal loop diagram for zero.facebook.com
increases. We use a rectangular box for MNO because it is a stock variable in our model.
In SD [113] terminology, a variable is called a stock, when it has a fixed value at one point
in time, the inflows coming into it increase its value and the outflows leaving it decrease
its value. There are two primary loops in this diagram; the exterior loop representing
the Facebook profitability and the interior loop representing the MNO’s profitability.
Facebook’s profitability is dependent upon the number of connected Facebook users.
MNO’s profitability is dependent on the number of subscribers as well as the subscribers
who are paying for the mobile data connectivity. Hence, the common profit driving variable
for both Facebook and MNO profitability is new paid Facebook mobile users. This means
that as the number of new paid Facebook mobile users increases, both the Facebook and
MNO profitability increase.
This case study exemplifies collaborative innovation between two incumbents namely
Facebook and MNOs. User experience control and customer stickiness (also termed as
customer loyalty in this thesis), are the significant links of this causal loop diagram.
Lessons learned from zero.facebook.com
Application alacrity
Zero.facebook.com included all the key features of the standard mobile site m.facebook.com.
Users could update their status, view their News Feed, like or comment on posts, send and
reply to messages, or write on their friends’ Facebook page/wall just as they would on
Facebook.com. Zero.facebook was Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) based, hence it
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was lightweight and efficient. Instead of making the photos viewable on zero.facebook.com,
they were kept one click away so they do not slow down the experience. Users could still
view any photos on Facebook if they wanted but in that case their regular mobile data
fees were applicable.
Zero cost
Facebook collaborated with MNOs to ensure that people can access zero.facebook.com
without any data charges. Using zero.facebook.com was completely free. Users only paid
for data charges when they viewed photos or when they left zero.facebook.com to browse
other mobile sites. When they clicked to view a photo or browse another mobile site, a
notification page would appear to forewarn of an associated charge.
User experience control
The number of Facebook users has been astronomical. In April 2016 [123], Facebook was
the most popular social networking site in the world, based on the number of active user
accounts. Facebook had more than two billion monthly active users in June 2017 [123]
and 2.41 billion [57] monthly active users on Facebook on 30th June 2019.
As evident from the above numbers social media led by Facebook has drastically
affected the way humans communicate. Users’ personal and professional lives have been
reshaped to the extent that even brain activity is being fundamentally altered [39]. Sparrow
et al. [111] observed that “we are becoming symbiotic with our computer tools, growing
into interconnected systems that remember less by knowing information than by knowing
where the information can be found”. Kirkpatrick [51] labels Facebook as “a technological
powerhouse with unprecedented influence across modern life, both public and private”.
He notes that in conjunction with other social media vehicles spawned in Facebook’s
aftermath, it offers individual liberation as well as a “safety in numbers” aspect that can
potentially affect social change in a variety of ways, ranging from organizing political
movements and protests in Columbia [51], to connecting the separated family members
and loved ones in a variety of ways; one such example being the aftermath of the Japanese
earthquake and tsunami [104]. Zero.facebook.com used the same idea of shaping the user
experience in emerging mobile markets by associating itself with the mobile user’s first
Internet experience. It is noteworthy that this was only accomplished through collaborative
innovation with MNOs.
5.6 Google Voice and Sprint
This case study is an example of coopetition enabling value chain evolution, where an
Over the Top (OTT) application is embraced by a MNO to create a mutually beneficial
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Figure 5.2: Causal loop diagram for Google Voice and Sprint
value added service to attract more customers.
Google Voice took the innovative route and encroached on U.S. mobile operators’ turf,
even offering to port a user’s carrier assigned mobile number for a $20 fee for use with
Google Voice service. But for one carrier, i.e. Sprint, the potential friction turned into a
partnership. On 20th March 2011, Sprint and Google announced deep integration with
Google Voice that allowed subscribers to use their Sprint phone number as a Google
Voice number to access the service features. Features offered included transcribed visual
voice mail (manage voice messages similar to e-mails), call forwarding (calls ring through
on subscribers’ cell phone, home phone, office phone, Gmail inbox and so on), custom
voice mail greetings, and competitive international calling rates, among other additional
offerings. Anyone could sign up for the free Google Voice service before, but Sprint-Google
Voice agreement brought forth a few notable exclusive benefits. First, Sprint simplified
getting on board with Google Voice. Previously, Google Voice users on any carrier needed
to walk through a number of steps to either get a new Google Voice number, port their
existing mobile number, or let Google handle just the voice mail. The results could be
confusing and cumbersome, with friends often collecting multiple phone numbers for a
contact, depending on several factors, including if the Google Voice user had a feature
phone, or used a Google Voice mobile application or website from a smart phone. As a
second benefit, all Google Voice calls originate from the same single number; the one first
issued by Sprint. Third, if you enable Google Voice, the service replaced Sprint’s voice
mailbox on your phone, so dialling “1” from the handset dialled up your Google Voice
message inbox. No additional set up on the Internet VoIP (Voice over IP) application
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would be required. Fourth, Sprint smart phones get most Google Voice features without
requiring a mobile app. Mobile texting is one exception to this last point, however, Sprint’s
rates and plans still apply for messages sent from the phone’s default texting program.
Google Voice texts remain free to the United States and Canada if sent from the Web or
from a Google Voice smartphone application.
5.6.1 Causal loop diagram for Google-Voice and Sprint
The −ve polarity arrow shown with red color in the Fig. 5.2 originating from churn and
leading to MNO profitability shows the simple negative causal relationship between these
two variables; as churn increases the MNO profitability decreases. Packaging VoIP with
cellular minutes increases the Value for Mobile Subscriber, which in turn increases the new
MNO subscription. As the consumer stickiness increased in this case, so did the consumer
expectations from the service offering. The integration failure issues led to a rise in failed
expectations, which increased the churn.
5.6.2 Lessons learned from Google-Voice and Sprint case study
Coopetition
This case study is an effective example of coopetition between an OTT VoIP service
provider and Mobile Network Operator (MNO). Sprint collaborated with its traditional
value chain competitor Google Voice. The ease of integration and price effectiveness
provided value for end user and increased subscriptions for both Google Voice and Sprint.
Hence, the first lesson to be learned from this case study is that competitors using different
technologies can actually act as complimenters.
Integration failures
Integration failures observed in this case study present a good example of possible pitfalls
in collaborative ventures. Technical interface integration issues between Google Voice
and Sprint for the international roaming mobile users, and lack of integration in the
texting/Short Messaging Service (SMS), resulted in failure to meet user expectations. The
collaborative failure rate increased, decreasing the value for mobile subscriber and in turn
reducing customer stickiness/loyalty. It is noteworthy that this setback did not affect
Google Voice revenue much because of it being an OTT platform. Internet users and
non-Sprint subscribers could still use Google Voice and map the Google Voice number to
other mobile carriers. Another significant factor is that Google itself had other service
offerings to sustain itself and Google Voice was willing to share similar collaborations
with other mobile operators. Sprint, however had a setback since they were already losing
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Figure 5.3: Causal loop diagram for NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode
revenue on regular mobile subscriptions and voice minutes. The MNOs are expected to
provide seamless support over their network including any new value added services. This
observation is endorsed by the aggregated model, presented in Section 5.8.
Negative feedback from user experience control
The Google Voice-Sprint venture’s most prominent selling point was its low price. The
international roaming integration failures caused the consumers to pay more because they
were forced to use the Sprint mobile minutes instead of low-priced Google-Voice minutes
while travelling overseas. This reduced the value for end user and magnified the sense of
entrapment that is incorporated in the perception of intrusiveness parameter in the final
aggregated model presented in Section 5.8. While a platform offers benefits of exclusivity,
it can also backfire, if the users are unable to enjoy the benefits of other free services
available in the market. A similar setback was witnessed in the next case study of NTT
DoCoMo’s i-mode.
5.7 NTT DoCoMo i-mode
In this case study, the years under observation are between 1999 and 2007, which were
the peak years of NTT DoCoMo i-mode’s success and subsequent setbacks. In 1999,
the Japanese population numbered 126 million. Of this 126 million, only 12.2 % of the
population had Internet access, compared with 39 % of the US population, 21 % of the
British population, and 23 % of the Korean population.
Despite the relatively low prevalence and popularity of Internet usage, the mobile
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handset usage and popularity was far ahead in Japan as compared to other industrially
developed countries. At the end of 1999, 44.5% of the Japanese population had mobile
phones, compared with 40% in the UK, and 31% in the USA. Dial-up telephone access
was expensive in Japan and consumers were obsessed with media and information access;
information ranging from daily stock exchange rates to weather updates to latest comic
publications. These facts presented Japanese market as an ideal stage [97] to sell a
reasonably priced mobile data service targeted towards specified segments of users with
the content and information of their choice, available on their mobile handsets round the
clock.
Despite the uniqueness of Japanese regulatory controls and the monopolistic situation
NTT DoCoMo enjoyed, it improvised as an operator to jump ahead in the value chain by
providing content availability and Internet experience to customers in a unique fashion.
By 1990, the Japanese mobile market had enjoyed meteoritic growth at a pace un-
matched by any other country in the world. In the latter half of 1990, the Japanese mobile
market was on the verge of reaching maturity, even though not complete saturation, when
NTT DoCoMo developed a novel service in the form of an innovative mobile Internet
platform with the aim of promoting a further evolution in mobile communications. The
i-mode service was launched in 1999 attracting overwhelming support from mobile phone
users. i-mode not only created new profitability in the mature mobile phone market,
but also redefined mobile communications for the new age by providing users with an
incomparable service. NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode proved to be a revolutionary walled garden
mobile Internet service in Japan. It offered the users a wide variety of services, including
web access, e-mail and the packet-switched network that delivered the data. i-mode users
could access services such as e-mail, sports, weather forecast, games, financial services and
ticket booking through a customized interface called i-Menu.
The primary reason for i-mode’s soaring initial success was the outstanding convenience
it offered to end users and its business model. The business model for i-mode was unique
and innovative spanning the entire mobile Internet value chain. It synchronized all value
chain aspects related to the user experience control, such as choice and quality of content
and Internet subscription. The consolidated billing system allowed DoCoMo to collect
information-access fees on behalf of i-Menu-listed content providers. NTT DoCoMo’s
i-mode collaborated closely with equipment manufacturers, content providers, and other
platforms to ensure that wireless technology, content quality, and user experience evolve
jointly. This synchronization guaranteed that customers, partners and shareholders shared
interests with end-users, thus enabling all parties to maximize value and improve the
services.
In contrast with the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) standard used for the website
zero.facebook.com, i-mode utilized fixed Internet data formats such as C-HTML based on
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HTML, as well as DoCoMo proprietary protocols ALP (HTTP) and TLP (TCP, UDP).
i-mode phones had a special i-mode button for the user to access the start menu. There
were more than 12,000 official sites and around 100,000 or more unofficial i-mode sites,
which were not linked to DoCoMo’s i-mode portal page and DoCoMo’s billing services.
NTT DoCoMo supervised the content and operations of all official i-mode sites, most of
which were commercial. These official sites were accessed through DoCoMo’s i-mode menu
but in many cases official sites could also be accessed from mobile phones by typing the
URL or through the use of QR code (a barcode).
NTT DoCoMo authorized all i-Menu content, while quality was maintained by setting
high operability standards and offering quality services. Other content providers comple-
mented these services via their own sites as demand dictated. The i-mode service was thus
energized by attracting more subscribers and by adding high-quality content.
The operator NTT DoCoMo controlled the user pricing and billing by collecting monthly
information charges for the i-Menu listed content providers via a consolidated bill for all
mobile phone activities, thus eliminating the need for provider billing. This arrangement
reduced expenses for the content partners and encouraged them to generate high-quality
offerings to attract new subscribers, thereby boosting their profits. Additionally, NTT
DoCoMo was able to generate incremental revenue by charging a small commission for
the billing service. Peak profit years were between 1999 to 2006; with over 22 million
subscribers within the first two years. By the middle of 2001, within a short span of two
years, i-mode had signed up nearly 20 % of the total Japanese population, or 25% of the
population between the ages of 15 and 64, and became the mostly widely used mobile
Internet service in the world.
Causal loop diagram for NTT DoCoMo i-mode
In Fig. 5.3 device incompatibility has a negative relationship with customer stickiness,
whereas the user experience control is positively correlated with customer stickiness.
Available content variety and better content quality drive an increase in the value for user
which in turn increases the subscription to i-mode. In Fig. 5.3 the i-mode profitability is
represented as a variable whereas the content provider is gaining the benefit of collaboration
through the increase in content development capital.
Lessons Learned from i-mode
Shaping User Experience Control
NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode presents an ideally vivid example of shaping and controlling
user experience by using technology. NTT DoCoMo had an existing customer base as a
traditional MNO, and its content designers were familiar with the demands of Japanese
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market on a segment-by-segment basis. DoCoMo leveraged the existing customer base
and the user profiling advantage to identify potential customers, design targeted services
based on customer interests (financial markets, comic strips, and cartoons, etc.), and
shape consumer experience. Key to i-mode’s success was its collaboration with device
manufacturers and content developers.
Value for end user
Characterized by the traditional slow transmission speed of the mobile Internet access in the
late ‘90s, i-mode’s successful strategy was to offer more value to the users compared to what
they were used to getting from the traditional wireline Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Unlike the ISPs, i-mode charged the users based on the amount of information downloaded
and not the connection time. For example, emails cost 1 Japanese Yen per 20 Japanese
characters (40 Roman letters), downloading still images cost 7 Yen, checking stock prices
cost 26 Yen, and transferring funds from bank accounts cost 60 Yen. While some of
i-mode’s content providers charged a flat monthly fee, others were free of charge. In 1999,
i-mode charged a basic monthly fee of 300 Yen ($3.5) and a packet fee (based on the
volume of data sent or received) of 0.3 Yen per 128 bytes of information. i-mode also priced
the mobile phone handsets reasonably in comparison to other mobile phones available in
the market.
An i-mode user paid for both sent and received data. Unsolicited emails could be
avoided through the email service hence making the cost fair. In addition to low price, the
billing method was also convenient for users. Instead of paying i-mode for service fees and
paying the content providers for subscription fees, i-mode customers received one monthly
bill with all of their mobile charges.
Collaborative innovation based on user needs
One target market that intrigued Takeshi Natsuno, Executive Director of NTT Do-
CoMo [27], included consumers interested in the financial markets and their own personal
finances. To appeal to this group, i-mode developed relationships with the banking in-
dustry. According to Natsuno, of the more than 700 content partners they had, 320 were
banks. Another target market comprised customers with an eye for comics. To serve this
segment, i-mode contracted the publishing firm Shueisha to provide weekly comic strips
for a monthly fee of 300 Yen (less than $4) for the transmission of a weekly comic strip.
The toy company Bandai sold charappa or cartoon characters. For less than $2 a month,
subscribers received a different cartoon image on their phone every day. By February 2000,
Bandai had 400,000 i-mode subscribers.
As Natsuno said [27], “the success of i-mode is because we adjust our site to Internet
users”. Furthermore, unlike a dial-up Internet connection, i-mode web access was always
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on, allowing customers to use the Internet without dialling the phone. Even the phones
were appealing to the Japanese market, with color screens, lightweight handsets, multi-
link navigation and better graphics capabilities. According to Mullins [97], the only
disadvantage of the product was its transmission speed of 9.6 kilobytes per second.
Win-win arrangement with content providers
NTT DoCoMo’s insight into the needs of its content providers was an important contributor
to its early success. By taking care of the customer billing, i-mode made business easy
for content providers, who were hesitant to sell online (because of the expensive and
cumbersome billing process). By outsourcing the billing to NTT DoCoMo, content
providers were able to concentrate on what they did best i.e., providing content, and
still generate earnings. In return for this, i-mode charged its content providers 9% of the
revenue.
The company kept a firm grip on its business, controlling all aspects of the i-mode
service. Unlike some European promoters of WAP (as used by zero.facebook.com), DoCoMo
knew that developing content would be crucial. DoCoMo required its content providers to
create entirely new content fit for the mobile phone. DoCoMo’s success did not depend on
its technology, which actually was not state-of-the-art, but in its ability to bring together
and direct all these services shaping and controlling the user experience.
The Achilles heel of a global trendsetter
A few months after DoCoMo launched i-mode in February 1999 [89], DoCoMo’s competitors
launched very similar mobile data services: KDDI launched EZweb, and J-Phone launched
J-Sky. Vodafone later acquired J-Phone including J-Sky, renaming the service Vodafone
live!. Seeing the tremendous success of i-mode in Japan, many operators in Europe, Asia
and Australia sought to license the service through a partnership with DoCoMo. The
quick success encouraged more operators to launch i-mode in their markets [27] and the
footprint reached 17 countries by 2017.
While i-mode was an exceptional service that positioned DoCoMo as a global leader in
value added services, the real success contributors for i-mode were the Japanese smartphone
manufacturers who developed state of the art handsets to support i-mode. As i-mode
was exported to the rest of the world, Nokia and other major handset vendors who
controlled the markets at the time, refused to manufacture i-mode compatible handsets.
The operators who decided to launch i-mode had to rely on Japanese vendors who had no
experience in international markets. As i-mode showed success in these markets, a few
known vendors started customizing some of their handsets to support i-mode. However,
the support was only partial and came much later than required.
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Figure 5.4: The aggregated model with loops
Consequently, the lack of “i-mode compatible handsets” (and the emerging popularity
of new handsets [54] most of which did not support i-mode), proved to be i-mode’s Achilles
heel and led to its downfall.
5.8 The aggregated model
Based on the lessons learned from the three case studies described in the previous Sec-
tions 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7, and the individual causal loop diagrams depicted in Fig. 5.1, 5.2,
and 5.3, an aggregated model was developed as illustrated in Fig. 5.4. Fig. 5.4 depicts the
causal loop structures while Fig. 5.5 uses Shadow variables for the ease of understanding
the parameter interconnections and dependencies. A Shadow variable is a copy of a
system dynamics variable used to reduce the complexity of the diagram and overlapping
of arrows. Following are some of the important parameters used in the aggregated model:
Firm innovation
Firm innovation can be described as the innovation that a firm develops in-house. This
could be measured in the number of inventions, patents or even the new products launched
by a firm. However in this model, “service features” are used as the units to measure firm
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Figure 5.5: The aggregated model with Shadow variables (Shadow is a copy of an SD
variable used to reduce complexity of the diagram)




Collaborative innovation between competitors is coopetition. For this evaluation, we used
the parameter of collaborative innovation to measure coopetition. Collaborative innovation
is the innovation where two or more organizations combine their resources to either develop
a new technology or to launch a new service. Similar to “firm innovation”, “collaborative
innovation” is measured in units of service features.
User experience control
“User experience control” is a parameter describing the service provider’s capability to own
and shape a user’s experience. Other factors such as consumer profiling and customization
of service offerings based on consumer needs, collectively work to enhance user experience
control. Traditionally, it was believed that billing interface ownership was the primary
criteria for being closely associated with the customer. However, this belief has been
challenged repeatedly in the recent years. The results from the model used in our work
also endorsed the fact that billing interface ownership might delay the customer churn by
some brief time period, but would not ensure customer loyalty by itself in the long run.
Perception of intrusiveness
As obvious from the name, this parameter refers to he consumer’s feeling of being intruded
upon, which is not only based on the loss of privacy (a possibility in the case of consumer
profiling and data mining which probes into the user’s consumption of applications and
choice of content etc.), but also on the user’s perception of confinement or entrapment
because of the rigidity of a certain platform or service and the lack of integration opportu-
nities. One such example is the lack of compatibility of i-mode handsets with the open
Internet and the non-availability of free content over the i-mode interface.
Additional evaluated parameters
Following is a list of some other parameters used in the aggregated system dynamics model
presented in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5. All functions are mathematical equations governing the
relationships between variables used in the model simulations. These equations (available
in Appendix A Section A.1 incorporate time delays as integral functions and are formulated
based on the data accumulated from interviews, financial records, and market reports
related to the case studies.
1. Adoption rate is a function of: Perception of Value for Money as well as Word of Mouth.
111
2. ARPU (Average Revenue per User) is a function of: Consumer spending as well as Platform
Enrichment.
3. Barriers to New Entrants is a function of: Customer stickiness as well as change adaptability
by user. This variable can be quantified with considering the other parameters, e.g., the Firm
innovation of one player in the value chain.
4. Billing Interface Ownership is a function of: Firm Innovation
5. Capital per service feature is a function of: Maximum capital, which is governed by the profitability
of the service provider.
6. Change adaptability by user is a function of: Total Customer base, a positive causal relationship
with Perception of Intrusiveness; it has a negative or balancing relationship to User Experience
Control.
7. Collaboration Failure rate is a function of: Innovation obsoletion rate as well as integration faults.
8. Collaborative Innovation is a stock or level.
9. Collaborative innovation rate is constant.
10. Competitive Advantage is a function of: Collaborative Innovation as well as Firm Innovation-
competitors average innovation level.
11. Consumer profiling is a function of: Customer stickiness.
12. Consumer spending is a function of: Perception of Value for Money.
13. Cost of Service Provider is a function of: Billing Interface Ownership, Total Customer base,
Time, Firm Innovation Rate, collaborative innovation rate, Total Customer base and Customer
maintenance Operating Expenditure (OPEX).
14. Customer maintenance OPEX is the operational cost of maintaining one customer per month.
15. Customer stickiness is a function of: Barriers to New Entrants, Perception of Value for Money and
Existing customers.
16. Effect of capital on innovation rate is a function of: Profitability Lookup, capital per service feature,
reference capital per service feature, and Profitability of Service Provider.
17. Existing customers is a constant, which was given values between 1000 to 20 mill]ion for different
classes of service providers.
18. FINAL TIME is the final time for the simulation = 2053, Units: year
19. Firm Innovation is a stock with firm innovation rate as inflow and firm innovation failure rate as
outflow, Units: service features
20. Firm innovation failure rate is a constant and varying values were utilized for test purposes
depending upon the technology and its life-cycle.
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5.9 Results
From the case studies described in the earlier sections of this chapter and the related
simulations of the aggregated system dynamics model, several results were deduced. Some
of these results are listed below:
1. It was concluded that collaborative innovation can improve sustainability and prof-
itability and elevate barriers to new entrants, i.e., deter competition when and if it
also contributes to the growth of firm (in-house) innovation.
2. The results from the model used in our work also endorsed the fact that billing
interface ownership might delay the customer churn for short time, but would not
alone ensure customer loyalty in the long run.
3. Another important conclusion was that platform enrichment (which includes offering
new innovative services to customers), increases the perception of value for money,
hence increasing user experience control. However, if perception of intrusiveness
keeps increasing, then beyond a certain threshold, platform enrichment fails to
increase the perception for value for money.
5.10 Socio-economic modelling for a future internet
architecture
Socio-economics [65] aims to understand the interplay between the society, economy,
markets, institutions, self-interest, and moral commitments. It is a multidisciplinary field
using methods from economics, psychology, sociology, history, and even anthropology.
Socio-economics of networks have been studied for over 30 years, but mostly in the context
of social networks instead of the underlying communication networks. It is imperative to
discover, discuss, and evaluate the challenges and perspectives related to “socio-economic”
issues to design a well-informed architecture for the future internet. It would lead to new
insights on how to structure the architecture and services in the future internet.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Internet is a remarkable platform enabling creativity,
collaboration, and innovation engendering amazing possibilities that would have been
impossible to imagine before its advent. If architected proactively with all salient variables
duly considered, the future internet could prove to be a source of further advancement
in all aspects of human life. One must admit that despite being a “best effort based”
and “resource hungry” technological marvel, the Internet has been immensely resilient
and dependable. However, the current Internet was never designed to serve massive scale
applications with guaranteed quality of service, scalability, and security.
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Emerging technologies like high quality video streaming and 3D applications face
severe constraints to run seamlessly anytime, everywhere, with good quality of services. In
June 2019, out of the approximate 7.7 billion people in the world only 4.5 billion (58.8%)
have Internet access [16] implying that global reach is still an ongoing issue. In order to
overcome the global digital divide (by providing affordable internet access to the next
few billion), new technical and business models must be co-designed to make the future
internet more economical, reliable, affordable, sustainable, secure, and hence feasible.
To evaluate the functional and non-functional requirements of a future internet ar-
chitecture, the qualitative parameters must be quantified in terms of the impact on the
dynamics that matter to the service providers who build and manage the infrastructures
based on these architectures.
5.11 RIFE
RIFE stands for “architectuRe for an Internet For Everybody (RIFE)” [4]. RIFE was
initiated to address the major societal challenge of affordability1, i.e., providing internet
access to those who cannot afford it by solving the technological challenge to increase
the efficiency of the underlying transport networks and the involved architectures and
protocols. Some of the objectives of RIFE were:
1) to utilize the traditionally unused transmission capacity.
2) to place content caches and service functionality closer to the user.
3) to use heterogeneous transmission opportunities that range from localized mesh and
home networks over well-connected ISP backhauls to scarce satellite resources.
RIFE also explored optimized dissemination strategies for ICN/CCN and delay-tolerant
networking.
During RIFE’s course of three years, RIFE:
1. Deployed an ICN network with 6 super nodes in 6 sites in the Catalonia region of
Tarragona, Spain, as illustrated in Fig. 5.7.
2. Advanced insights into the suitability of providing cheaper Internet connectivity
through IP-over-ICN given that regular operators are often more expensive in
provisioning Internet services in remote locations.
3. Innovated in areas such as surrogate management, multi-casting, and edge caching.
4. Advanced insights into how to stimulate localized service deployments.
5. Advanced insights into the operational complexity of localised service deployments.
1one of the non-functional requirements mentioned in Chapter 5
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Figure 5.7: RIFE ICN/CCN Deployment
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6. Provided technical guidance to develop the next version of IP-over-ICN
RIFE also developed, deployed, and showcased a real-life setting within a large-scale
community network in Spain, demonstrating the technology and economic opportunities
provided by the RIFE platform. The real-life test beds were complimented with emulation
scenarios to enable the evaluation of novel resource management schemes at scale, while
integrating with RIFE’s prototype platform. RIFE’s long term economic objective is to
develop business opportunities for local authorities as well as back-haul network providers
to create a sustainable value chain by introducing virtual network operators that utilize the
under-used capacity in a new business relationship with local customers, enabling socially-
driven business models. The involvement of a technology, equipment, satellite, and/or
community network provider would allow to maximize the commercial exploitation of
RIFE within real deployments and towards standard communities within the IETF/IRTF
and beyond, placing RIFE in the centre of a growing community of practitioners that all
share the same goal: making the Internet affordable to everybody. During my PhD, I
worked on the RIFE project for a year and used system dynamics for the socio-economic
modelling for RIFE. A basic introduction to system dynamics has been provided earlier in
this thesis in this chapter in Section 5.2. A few stakeholders and their salient parameters
were selected and their primitive mutual causal correlations were identified. The objective
for using system dynamics modelling was to validate the socio-economic feasibility of
RIFE, and to quantify the foreseen qualitative benefits. SD models/causal loops presented
here illustrate initially identified variables/parameters and their long term impact on each
other from a RIFE perspective. Four models namely Model A, Model B, Model C, and
Model D are presented in this thesis. These models are works in progress as variables are
being discovered, added, merged and edited. It is noteworthy that these models are in a
nascent stage (causal loops only without defined equations) and are expected to evolve as
an extension of my research.
5.12 Model A: Communication service providers and
end user stakeholders’ dynamics
This model depicts the overall holistic picture with relationships between following major
stakeholders:
1. Virtual Network Operator (VNO)
2. Mobile Network Operator (MNO)
3. Communication Service Provider (CSP)
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Figure 5.8: Model A: Communication service providers and end user stakeholders’ dynamics
4. End user
Variables used in this model are listed below:
1. VNO profitability = profitability of the Virtual Network Operator
2. Customer ownership = the control over user experience e.g. access through billing
and customer services
3. Consumer surplus = purchasing power per customer
4. Innovation capacity = the capacity to innovate/ launch a new or disruptive technology
5. Barrier of entry = barrier or deterrent in launching a new service
6. Cannibalization rate = rate at which one new innovation damages the existing
business e.g. in this case the VNO service traction destroying the tier-1 primary
provider network operator.





Figure 5.9: Model B: Innovation adoption model
10. Health facilitation
11. MNO profitability
12. Satellite operator’s profitability
13. Regulatory constraints
5.13 Model B: Innovation adoption model
Model B is an innovation adoption model for CSP/VNO’s role in health and education
provisioning. This model utilized the innovation adoption concept which may also be
described as the adoption probability or feasibility of a new technology or architecture.
This model can be used to test and simulate possible future internet architectures. However,
here it is used to evaluate the possibility of a health provider and/or education provider
to assume the additional role of VNO or vice versa.
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Figure 5.10: Model C: Health/Education provider as VNO
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Figure 5.11: Model D: Economies of scale and economies of scope
5.14 Model C: Health/Education provider as CSP/VNO
Model C is a possible extension of the Model B presented in the last section. The main
concept is the same, i.e., to evaluate the feasibility of a health provider and/or education
provider to assume the additional role of Virtual Network Operator or vice versa. However,
the innovation adoption model for VNO’s role as Health and/or education provider shows
a possible addition of flexible Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning here.
5.15 Model D: Economies of scale and economies of
scope
Model D is an attempt to highlight the economies of scale and economies of scope concepts
which imply that unit cost can be decreased if the scope is expanded or scale is expanded.
This concept has been be derived from the scalability requirements of possible RIFE use
cases.
Since two of the most significant ilities to be considered while designing a futuristic
and future-proof internet architecture are affordability and scalability: we must gauge all
prospective future internet proposals on the basis of economies of scale and economies
of scope. Economies of scale and economies scope are imperative for a future internet
architecture designed to overcome the global digital divide. Fig. 5.11 just depicts a basic
causal loop and can be extended by introducing parameters and mathematical correlations
salient to the specific internet architectural design as well as the focal stock (primary
variable) to be measured.
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5.16 Non-functional requirements of CCN and sys-
tem dynamics modelling
The Chapters 2, 3, and 4 presented challenges to availability, integrity, and confidentiality
challenges in NDN; the corresponding proposed solutions are a significant technical
contribution towards a secure and trusted future internet architecture. In this chapter,
we transitioned from the technical analysis to system dynamics modelling: by assigning
values to and then evaluating certain qualitative parameters. Even though it may not
be immediately obvious, however, these variables are salient to availability, integrity, and
confidentiality of data directly and indirectly. For example, one of the parameters evaluated
in the three case studies and aggregated model, i.e., perception of intrusiveness can also
be alternatively called privacy sensitivity. This chapter primarily presented examples
of system dynamics modelling through real life case studies. Similar evaluations could
measure the impact of functional/non-functional security parameters, such as utility cost
of delay, privacy sensitivity, value of availability, and integrity of data as supported by the




Conclusions and future work
6.1 Conclusions from the technical evaluations
As specified in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1, the problem statement for this thesis was to
evaluate if it is possible to address security requirements including Availability, Integrity,
and Confidentiality for Content Centric Networking (CCN). We ventured to do so by
evaluating the threats to: 1) Availability of CCN via a DDoS attack, 2) to Integrity of
CCN through a content poisoning attack and 3) to Confidentiality of CCN through content
name privacy threats, and their respective countermeasures. Following is a brief summary
of what was achieved in context of these evaluations for each of these three areas.
1. In Chapter 2 we have considered the IFA DDoS attacks and proposed Kiram as a
mitigation mechanism. However, some other DDoS attacks such as Bandwidth De-
pletion attack, Black-holing by prefix-hijacking, and Reflection attack are mentioned
in Section 2.2. For future work we can run ndnSIM simulations for these attacks
as well as do real life testing for Kiram for IFA DDoS attacks. Since Kiram is a
temporal learning mechanism, a larger network and longer learning time may reveal
further benefits of this approach. Further work can also be done to equip the alert
message called WOE with more effective and meaningful information.
2. In Chapter 3 we explored the content poisoning attack in NDN and its mitigation
through a proposed framework named Iris. We amalgamated and improvised upon
the honeypot and exclusion techniques and introduced the reverse MA-ABE technique
in Iris. Using these techniques as an intelligent framework, Iris detects the fake
content objects, identifies, and isolates the Compromised Consumers, and eventually,
the Adversarial Producers. We used AT&T topology over ndnSIM and demonstrated
the effectiveness of Iris through extensive simulations. Future work in this area
includes extension of trust federations in Iris and its implementation in other CCN
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networks. Moreover, we continue to pursue the scalability of Iris through large scale
deployments.
3. In Chapter 4, we explored name privacy in NDN through name obfuscation and
gateway-oriented onion routing. Privacy and utility are optimally chosen by the
user (or application) using the utility function. User privacy is a critical aspect
of NDN confidentiality and the users may have variable needs of privacy based on
the nature of content they intend to access. Based on this premise, we enable the
user to choose from different levels of privacy related to two aspects, i.e., the name
itself and its correlation with the user. The hierarchy of the name is maintained
in the proposed mechanism. We used Rocketfuel topology in ndnSIM to measure
the privacy protection level and the consequential network delay. For future work,
other simulation topologies as well as real life test beds of these simulations can help
us verify the effectiveness of our solution with the required trade-off between user’s
utility and privacy. Further work may also identify the impact of different users
choosing different levels of privacy (name obfuscation and gateways) for the same
content and same content name, upon the delay and hence utility function.
6.2 Conclusions from system dynamics
The thesis problem statement in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1 also stated the possibility of
demonstrating that the trade-offs in ensuring the Availability, Integrity, and Confiden-
tiality (AIC) in CCN by countering the salient security threats imply that the previously
overlooked non-functional aspects of AIC in CCN could now be quantitatively factored
into the design and deployment plans for the prospective future internet architecture.
As discussed in Chapter 5, in order to evaluate the functional and non-functional
requirements of a future internet architecture, the qualitative parameters must be quantified
in terms of impact on the dynamics that matter to the service providers who build and
manage the infrastructures based on these architectures.
The case studies, system dynamics modelling examples, the RIFE work presented
in Chapter 5 and future work proposals mentioned in the next Section 6.2.1 focus on
quantifying the non-functional elements of future internet architectures; showcasing the
significance of taking these pertinent variables into account, in order to remove barriers to
the successful uptake and deployment of any prospective internet architecture.
6.2.1 Further System Dynamics evaluations
1. Parameter evaluation for RIFE socioeconomic models
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Models A,B,C, and D described in Sections 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15 are works
in progress awaiting further data acquisition which is imperative for identification,
addition, and consolidation of new variables salient to the innovation, governance,
information security, regulatory, social, and economic aspects of a future internet
design.
Next steps involve short-listing and correlating all these variables driving innovation
diffusion, profitability, and sustainability of communication service providers. Rele-
vant historical and current data is required to formulate the equations behind the
causal relationships.
2. Evaluation of the Availability, Integrity, and Confidentiality parameters
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis presented availability, integrity, and confidentiality
threats and their corresponding technical mitigation techniques respectively. The
next step is to use the quantitative representation of the parameters evaluated
(such as cost and delay to evaluate availability) to inform the design decisions for a
future-proof internet architecture.
3. Relevance for other future internet architecture proposals
The system dynamics modelling and evaluation approach presented in this thesis
can be easily applied to other future internet architecture proposals1 (e.g., to other
ICN architectures, Accountable Internet [28], and I3 [114]) etc. Also as described
earlier in this section, there is vast scope of extending this analysis to the numerous
variables mentioned in Chapter 5 Table 5.1. By using real world field implementation
data for CCN, financial reports from ISPs, and the market analysis as utilized in
Chapter 5 (for the three case studies exploring service provider profitability, value
for the end user, and collaborative innovation etc.), causal loop diagrams leading
to complete System Dynamics models backed by mathematical equations, can be
designed and simulated for a desired period of time. The results from these models
can be used to inform internet architecture design, policy, legislation, and regulatory
decisions for technology architects, policymakers, lawmakers, and regulators, and to
launch business strategies for disruptive innovations by internet service providers.
1NSF sponsored FIA program in USA and European research initiatives are listed in Chapter 1
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A.1 Equations for the aggregated system dynamics
model simulation
Following are some of the equations used in basic run simulations (from the previous
work [78]) on the extended SD model described earlier in presented in Chapter 5.3
Section 5.8 and illustrated in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 of this thesis:
1. Adoption rate = Perception of Value for Money+Word of Mouth Units: cust/year
2. ARPU= “Consumer spending (on QoS etc)”+ Platform Enrichment Units: $/year
3. Barriers to New Entrants = INTEG (customer stickiness-change adaptability by
user,0) Units: dmnl [0,10]
4. Billing Interface Ownership = Firm Innovation/Time Units: dmnl/year
5. capital per service feature = RAMP(max capital/(FINAL TIME-INITIAL TIME),
INITIAL TIME, FINAL TIME) Units: $/service feature
6. change adaptability by user = (Perception of Intrusiveness-User Experience Control)*
Total Customer base *Time Units: cust/year
7. Collaboration Failure rate = innovation obsoletion rate + integration faults Units:
dmnl/month [0,10]
8. Collaborative Innovation = INTEG (collaborative innovation rate - Collaboration
Failure rate,0) Units: service features [0,100]
9. Collaborative innovation rate = 100 * innovation rate Units: service features/year
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10. Competitive Advantage = Collaborative Innovation Firm Innovation-competitors
average innovation level Units: service features [0,100]
11. Competitors average innovation level = constant value of 50 inferred from market
data on service features of mobile service features including package plans, etc. Units:
service features
12. consumer profiling = 0.8 * customer stickiness (various fractions of customer stickiness
were tried) Units: dmnl [0,10]
13. Consumer spending (on QoS etc) = Perception of Value for Money Units: $/month
[0,10]
14. Cost of service provider = (Billing Interface Ownership * Total Customer base)/Time
+ Firm Innovation Rate + 0.5* collaborative innovation rate+(Total Customer base
*Customer maintenance OPEX) Units: $/year
15. Customer maintenance OPEX = MAX[OPEX, BILLING INT OWNERSHIP+OPEX]
is the operational cost of maintaining one customer per year Units: $/year
16. Customer stickiness = (Barriers to New Entrants+Perception of Value for Money)*Existing
customers *Time Units: cust/month [0,10]
17. Effect of capital on innovation rate = Profitability Lookup (capital per service
feature/reference capital per service feature) * 0.1 * Profitability of Service Provider
Units: dmnl
18. Existing customers = 1e+06 Units: customers
19. FINAL TIME = 2059 Units: year
20. The final time for the simulation. Firm Innovation = INTEG (Firm Innovation
Rate-firm innovation failure rate,1) Units: service features
21. Firm innovation failure rate = constant values tested ranging 0 to 10 Units: service
features/year [0,10]
22. Firm Innovation Rate = ACTIVE INITIAL ( RAMP(2,0,(3 * innovation rate + 0.3
* Collaborative Innovation)), 10) Units: service features/year [0,50,1]
23. INITIAL TIME= 2019 Units: year The initial time for the simulation.
24. Innovation obsoletion rate = RAMP (1,0,0.1) * Time Units: service features/year
25. Innovation rate = Normal innovation rate * effect of capital on innovation rate Units:
service features/$/year
140
26. Integration faults = 1 to 30 Units: service features/year
27. Max capital = fraction of profitability Units: $/service feature
28. Normal innovation rate Units: service features/year
29. Perception of Intrusiveness = 0.5 * consumer profiling + 0.5 * User Experience
Control Units: dmnl
30. Perception of Value for Money = Competitive Advantage * Platform Enrichment
Units: $/service feature [0,100]
31. Platform Enrichment = Collaborative Innovation + Firm Innovation Units: service
features [0,10]
32. Profitability Lookup( [(0,0)-(30,100)],(0.794297,4.7619),(6.17108,19.5238),(12.4644,30),(16.2525
,35.2381),(19.8574,47.1429),(24.1955,62.381),(27.2505,62.381),(29.6334,63.8095)) Units:
dmnl
33. Profitability of Service Provider = INTEG ( Revenue-Cost of service provider,0)
Units: $ [0,10]
34. Reference capital per service feature = various constant values tested Units:$/service
feature
34. Revenue= ARPU*Total Customer base Units: $/year
35. Total Customer base = INTEG ( Adoption rate + customer stickiness * Total Cus-
tomer base-change adaptability by user * Total Customer base, Existing customers)
Units: customers
36. User Experience Control = INTEG (user experience control rate - User Experience
Control Loss rate, 1) Units: dmnl
37. User Experience Control Loss rate = Perception of Intrusiveness - Perception of
Value for Money Units: dmnl/month
38. User experience control rate = Billing Interface Ownership + consumer profiling +
Platform Enrichment Units: dmnl/month
39. Word of Mouth = 0.5 * customer stickiness Units: cust/month
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